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UNTTSr) STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL IV

SITTING IN THE PALACE OF JUSTICE,
11 APRIL 1949

TliE

UNITED

STATES

OP

NURNBERG,

GERr.'lANY

AMERICA

again st
ERNST VON Vi/EIZSAECKER,

GUSTAV ADOLF STEENGR/iCHT VON MOYLAND,
WILHELM KEPFLER,

'

ERNST Vv'ILHELM BOHLE,
ERNST WOERMANN,
KARL RITTER,
OTTO VON ERDmNNSDORFF,
EDMUND VEESENMAYER,
HANS HEINRICH LAMi'.ffiRS,
WILHELM STUCKART,
RICHARD WALTHER DARIvE,
OTTO IViEXSSNEK,
OTTO DIETRICH,
GOTTLOB BEKGEK,
WALTER SCHELLEI'TBEKG,

Case No. 11

LUTZ SCPTYfERiM vON KKOSIGK,
EMIL PUHI..,
KARL RASCHE,
PAUL KOELNER

PAUL PLEIGER and

f

HANS KEHRL,
Defendants

•V:' •:

JUDGrffiNT 01' THE TRIBUITAL

t

.ii.v

0

William C. Cbristianaon, Presiding Judge
Leon

Powers, Judge

Robert P. Maguire, Judge

tee ihtited status or alo^irica
a,o:ainst

3RITST VOIT VEIZSAECISR, GUSTAV ADOLF
CASS UO.

STLEITGRACKT VGE EOyL/ATD, V1LK2U:

lOilPPDOR, ERIiST L'TLHELi.: SOIIir, LREST
V/OLRLlAini, rJlRL RITTSR, OTTO VOiT
LRDIL'VirrTSDORPP, PDI.IUIID VLSSEiri.TTiPE,

11

JUDGIL^ilT

HAITS I-ISIl^IRICH LAI^RIERS,

STUCrj\RT, RICIR\RD L'ALTIiLR DARRL,
OTTO I.ILI3S1ICR, OTTO DISTRICH,
GOTTLOB HSRGLR, L-ALTTR SCflELLEITDLPvG,
LUTZ SCIIV.TjRIN VOE KROSIGK, LniL PUHL,
IBVRL RASCIIL, PAUL KOLRITER, PAUL
PL2IGLR and IIAilS ICEHRL
Defendants

On 15 November, 1947, an Indictment against the above-

named defendants was filed wUth the Secretary General of the

U, S, Military Tribunals at Uin'nberg,

Generally stated, said

Indictment, consisting of eight counts, charged the defendants
with having comriiitted crimes against peace, v;ar crimes, crimes

against humanity, and with having participated in a conmon

plan and consplracy to commit crimes against peace all as
defined in Control Council Lav; ITo. 10, duly enacted by the
Allied Control Council on 20 December, 1945.

Several, but not all, of the defendants are charged
under each of the coimts of the Indictment.

The applicable

provisions of Control Comicil Lav; ITo. 10 will hereinafter be
referred to and set forth as they relate to each count of the

Indictment, when such counts are reached for discussion and
decis ion.

The Indictment was served upon all of the
defendants in the German language, more than thirty

days "before arraignment of the defendants thereunder.
On 19 December, 1947, the case was assigned to this

Tribunal for trial by the Supervisory Committee of
Presiding Judges of t bj8 b, S. Military Tribunals in
Germany, in conformity with Article V of Military
✓

•

Government Ordinance llo, 7, as amended, this Tribunal

theretofore having been duly established and constituted, pursuant to'said Ordinance lio. 7, vjhich ordi
nance w^s promulgated by the U, s. Military Governor

of the TJ, S, Occupation Zone of Germany on 18 October
1946.

The arraignment of the defendants took place on

20 December, 1947, at v/hich time all defendants pleaded
Hot Guilty to the cliarges In the Indictment.

Throughout the trial of this case, all of the

defendants were represented by German counsel of their
own choice.

One defendant requested that he also be

allowed to retain American counsel to represent him.
The request was granted.
The presentation of evidence in the

commenced ..on 7 January, 1948.

case v;as

Final arguments before

A

^

the Tribunal v/ere concluded on IB povember, 1948. The
transcript record of the cose consists of 28,085 pages.

In addition thereto, the prosecution and the defense
together introduced in evidence 9,067 documentary ex

hibits, totalling-over o9,000 pages,

Generally accepted

technical rules of evidence were not adhered to during
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the trial, and any evidence that, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, had probative value, v?aa admitted when

offered by either the prosecution or the defense. This

practice was in accord with that followed by the Inter
national Military Tribunal, and as subsequently thereto

provided in Section VII of the hereinbefore referred to
Military Government Ordinance IIo. V. In the interest of
expedition the Tribunal, following the practice adopted

by the International Ililitary Trib^anal, appointed court
commissioners to assist in taking both oral and docu
mentary evidence, but many of the principal witnesses
and all of the defendants viho testified were heard be
fore the Tribunal itself.

In order that any relevant documentary defense
evidence of v.hich the defcncisnts had loiowledge, ,or

which they believed existed, might bo made available
to the defense, the Tribunal, in response to various
defense motions, uniformly ordered that the persons

or agencies having posscssio]:! or custody of such evi
dence make same available to the defense.

This v/as

even true with respect to documentary evidence in

possession of the prosecution.

Horeover, at the request

of a number of the defendants, the Tribunal appointed a

Gorraan research analyst, of t ho defendants

choice, for

the purpose of making a search of files of the former
Reich government, located in the Documentary Center in
Derlin, under Allied control. Such research analyst
spent many months in Berlin in this search for defense

^3^

evidence.

The ssmc research expert v^cs further author

ized hy this Tribunal to visit London for the purposes
of research, in behalf of the defendants, and was, in

fact, so engaged for a number of weeks with the coopera
tion of British authorities.

Other representatives yiqvq

likewise authorized to make search of former I7eich govern
ment files

in Berlin.

In arriving at the conclusions hereinafter reached,

with respect to the charges against the defendants, as
contained in the Indictment, the Tribunal has undeviatingly

adhered to the proposition that a defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the course of the trial, a motion v;as made

in behalf of all defendants charged in Count Pour of the
Indictment that said count be stricken.

The motion was

granted and a formal order in the matter made and filed

by tho Tribunal.

During tho trial from timo to time, motions were

also made in behalf of individual defendants, to dismiss

counts of the Indictment rolcting to them, on the ground

that tho Tribmal v;os without jurisdiction to try the

defenaanus on such counts, and on the further ground that
the evicicncc adduced by the prosecution was insufficient
to sustain tho charges.

Such motions were denied without

prejudice, excepting in tliroe instances, v/here charges
in certain counts of the Indictment were dismissed, with
respect to certain defendants, because of a failure of
proof.

Specific attention to the charges thus dismissed,

-A-

and the aefenaonts affectea tl-xirehy, rill he made when
the charges involved in snch dismissals are reached in
the ensuing discussion of the individual counts of the
IndicGment,

Like attention will he called to instances

wherein the pro3ecution,during the trial, withdrew cer
tain charges against certain of tho defendants.

In the final arguments and briefs of the defendants,

the contention that this Tribunal is without jurisdiction
in this rnatuer was renewed.

In this connection, attention

is.directed to the fact that a number of U.S. Lilitary
Tribunals, of precisely the same type and origin as this

one, have heretofore had their jurisdiction questioned
on similar grounds in the course of their trial of cases
Involving offenses defined in Control Council Low Uo. 10.

(Flick, ot cl. Case Uo, 5; List ct al, Case IJo. 7; and
Ohlcndorf, ot al, Case ITo, 9.)

The statements made in

the judgments of such oases, in the course of disposing
of the attacks made on the jurisdiction of such Tribunals,
we deem to be conclusive answers to the challenge here

made to this Tribunal's jurisdiction, ondwc accordingly
reject the contention of the defendants that these pro
ceedings should be dismissed because of the Tribunal's
lack of jurisdiction.

The record, including briefs of counsel, all of

which the court has considcroc] and examined, amounts to
Spproximately 79,000 pages.

The evidence of this case

presents a factual story of practically overy phase of

-5-

activity of the hazi Party ant? of the Thirt^. Reich, whether
political, economic,

industrial, financial or military^

Huncreds of captured official documents were offered,

received and considered., which were unavailable at the trial

before the International Military Tribunal (sometimes herein
referred to as the IMT), and which were not offered in any of
the previous cases before United States Military Tribunals,
and the record here presents, more fully and completely than

in any other case, the story of the rise of the ^^'azi regime,
\

4

Its programs and its acts.

The Tribunal has had the aid of, and hero desires to
express its appreciation and gratitude for,

t^c s'^ill, learn

ing and meticulous care with which counsel for the prosecution
and defense have presente'^ their case.

Notwithstanding the oro'^dsions in Article 10 nf Ordi

nance 7,

/

t-hat the determination of the International Military

Tribunal, that invasi'^ns, aggressive acts, aggressive wars,
crimes, atrocities and inhumane acts were planned or occurred,
shall be binding on the Tribunals established thereunder and
caii-iOt be questioned except insofar as the oartlcipa.tlon

therein and knowledge thereof of any particular person may be
concerned,

evidence
^

not

we

upon

considered

have

0.11
this

permitted

these

the

defense

matters.

article

to

In
be

so
a

to

offer

doing

limitation

we

have
on

the

A

right

of

the

Tribunal

to

consider
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pny

evidence

which

may Icaci to a just determination of tho facts.

If in

this WG have erred, it is an error which v;g do not ro-

gret, as v;-a are firmly convinced that coirrts of justice
must always remain o.pen to the ascertainment of the
truth and tliat every defendant must be accorded an oppor
tunity to present the facts.
Before considering the questions of lav; and fact

which are here involved, wo deem it proper to state the

nature of thesd trials, the basis on viiich they rest,
and the standards by which these defendants should be
judged.

Those Tribunals wore not organ±zccl and do not sit

for the purpose of wreahlng vengeance upon tho conquered.
#

Was such the purpose, tho power existed to use tho firing
)

•

^

squad, the scaffold, or the ;-rj.son camp, without taking
the time and putting forth labor which have been so freely
expended on them, and the Allied Pc-'Ors would have copied
the methods which wore too often u.sed during the Third
Reich,

We may not, in justice, apply to these defendants

because they are Germans, standards of duty and responsi
bility v.iiich arc not equally applicable to the officials
of tho Allied Pov/ers and to those of •all nations.

ITor

should Germans be c onvictod for acts or conducts v/hich,
if cprrmiittod by Americans,British, French or Russians

would not subject them to legal trial and conviction.
Both care and caution must bo oxercisod not to prescribe

or C'pply a yardstick to those defendants which cannot
and should not bo applied to others, irrespoctivo of
whether they arc nationals of the victor or oftho van
quished.

-7-

^ The dofcndants hove ere charged mth violation
or international loiv, and our task is? First, to ascer

tain and determine v/hat it is, and Second^ Y;hethcr the

defendants have infringed these principles.
International Lav; is not statutory.

It is in

part defined hy and described in^treaties and covenants
among the pov/ers of the world.. ITevcrtheloss, much of it

^
*

consists of practices, principles and standards vAiich
have become developed over tho years and have found gonoral
accexDtanco among tho clviliaod powers of the v/orld.

It has

grown and expanded as the concepts of International right

and wrong have grown.

It has never been suggested tha.t it

has been codified, or that its boundaries have boon speci

fically defined, or that sjeocific sanctions have boon pro
scribed for violations of it.

The various Hague and

Geneva Conventions, tho Constitutions and Charter of tho

League of Nations, and the Hollogg-Brland treaties have
given definitive shape to limited fields of international
law.

I t can bo said that

in so far as certain acts are

prohibited or permitted by thoso treaties or covenants,
a codification exists and specific rules of conduct pre

scribed.

It docs not f ollov.', however, that they are
%

exclusive^ and assuredly, it cannot bo said that they
cover or pretend to cover the entire field

of international

lav;.

In determining whether tho a ction of a nation is
in accordance with or violates international lav;, resort
may be had not only to those treaties and covenants, "tout

-8-

to treatises on the subject and t o the principles v/hich
lie beneath and back of those treaties,

covenants and

learned treatises, and v/e need not hesitate after liaving

determined v/hat they are, to aiaply them to ncv; or dif
ferent situations.

It is by this very means that all

legal codes, civil or criminal, have developed.

Aggressive ^7ars and Invasions.

The question, therefore,

is whether or not the London Charter and Control Council

Law ko, 10 define new offenses or v/hethcr they are but
definitive statements of pre-existing international law.
That monarchs and states, at least those who considered

themselves civilized, have for centuries recognized that
aggressive wars and

invasions violated the Law of Hatlona

is evident from the fact that invariably he who started
his troops on the march, or his fleets over the seas to
✓

wage war, has endeavored to explain and justify the act

by asserting that there was no desire or intent to in
fringe upon the lav/ful rights of the

attacked nation, or

to engage in cold-blooded conquest, but on the contrary

that the hostile acts became necessary because of the

enemy^s disregard of Its obligations; that it had violated
treaties, that it held provinces or cities which in fact
belonged to the

attacker,

or that It had mistreated or

discriminated against his peaceful citizens.

Often those justifications and excuses were offered

v,'ith cjTiical disregard of the truth.

Novcrtholoss, it

was felt necessary that an excuse and justification be

-9-
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offered for the attack to the end the attacker ral^ht

not ho rc^ardod by other nations as ccting in v/'cnton
disregard of international duty and responsibility.
Prom Caesar to Hitler the same practice has been fol-

lov/od.

It was used by lyapolcon, was adopted by Frodorick

the Great, by Phi'lip II of 3pain, by Edward I of England,
of Louis XIV of Prance, and b y the povrers who seized

lands which thoy desired to colonise and make their ov/n.

Every and all of the attackers followed the sane timc-

\7orn practice.

The white, the blue, the yellow, black and

the red books had only one pvu^poso, namely, to justify
that v/hich was othcriviso unjustifiable.

But if aggressive invasions and wars wore lawful
and did not constitute a breach of international law and

duty, why toko the troublo to explain and justify? ^^hy
inform neutral nations that thowar wa_s inevitable and

excusable and based on high notions of morality, if aggros-

sivo war was not essentially v/rong and a breach of inter

national lcv>'?

The ansv/er to this is obvious.

The initiation

'of wars and invasions, v/ith their attendant horror and
suffering, has for centuries been universally recognized
by all civilized nations as wrong, to be resorted to only
as a last resort to romody wrongs already or imminently

;

to be inflicted,

I^e hold that aggressive '• ara and inva

sions have, since time immomorial, been a violation of

international lav/, oven though specific sanctions v/ero not
provided.

The Kellogg-Brland Pact not only recognized that
aggressive wars and invasions were in violation of

-10-
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intcrnrtion.?! lav, but proceeded to take the next step,

namely, to condemn recourse to v/er (otherviso justifiablo
for the solution of international controversies), to
renounce it as an instrumentality of national policy, and

' to provide for the settlement of all disputes or conflicts

by pacific moans.

Thus v.-ar.as a means of cnforcins la.v/ful

claims and d craands became unlav/ful.

The risht of self-

defense, of course, vas naturally preserved, but only
%

becaviso if rcsi stance v; as not immediately offered, a nation
vould be overrun and conquered before it could obtain the

jud :racnt, of any international authority that it v;as justi
fied in resisting, attack.

The preamble of tho treaty provides that the nations
doclaro their conviction

"that any signatory povor which shall heroafter seek to promote its national interest

by resort to war should bo denied the bene
fits furnished by tho Treaty."

Quincy v.'right, Professor of International Law,

University of Chicago, in January 1933 (American Journal
of International Law, Volume 21, ITo. 1, January 23, 1933),
reviews tho Pact and tho conclusions put upon, and the

implications arising from its provisions by the leading
statesmen of that time. Ho

^iiotcs Secretary Stimson as

follows I

"Under the former concept of inter-^
national law, when a conflict occurred it

was usually doomed the ooncern only of the
partiVs to the conflict • * .But now, under

t,he covenant and tho Briand-Kellogg Pact,

the conflict becomes of legal concern to

everybody connected with the Treaty.

All

steps taken to enforce the Treaty must be

-11-
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I

adjudged by thla'nov; situation..

As was

said by M.Briand, quoting the vjords of
President Coolidges

*An Act of v/ar in any part of
the world

is

an act that

injures the-interests of my
country. *

"The \vorld has learned that great
lesson and the execution of the Kellogg-

Briand Treaty codified it."
Professor bright continuess

"Furthermore, the suggestion that the
obligation is not legal because it is unpro
vided with sanctions has carried no more weight.I'any treaties have no specific sanctions but
insofar as they create obligations under inter
national law, those obligations are covered by
the

sanctions

of a l l

international lav/.-..

"In his exposition of the treaty. Secre
tary Ilellogg pointed out ^thcre can be no ques
tion as a matter of law, that the violation of a
multilateral anti-war treaty tlirough resort to

war by one narty thereto would automatically

release the" other parties from their obligations
to the treaty-breaking states. Any express recog
nition of this principle of law is wholly uiinecessary^

....

"These changes in international law conse

quent upon the Gxistenco of war, arise from the
following propositionss

"1.

A Party to the Pact responsible for

initiating a state'of war (a primory belligerent)
will have violated the rights of all the parties
to the Pact and will have lost all title to its

benefits from non-participating states as well as
from i t s enemies.

"2.
A Party to the Pact involved in a state
of war but not responsible for initiating it (a
secondary belligerent) •••ill not have violated the
Pact and conse'uently v.-ill continue entitled to its

benefits not only from non-participating states
but also from its onomies..

"3.

The other Parties to the Pact, non-

participating in the war or ^partial', v/hile free
to keep out of the ^'ar, will have suffered a '
legal injury tlirougli the outbreak of war, and,

-12-

though hound to oxtond the full hcnoflts of
the trcditiono.l intornctionol lev; of neutral

ity as well as the benefits of the Pact to the
secondary 'bclligeront, v;lll be free to deny
those benefits .to the nrimary belligerent,"
It

is to be noted that those vieivswere expressed

long before the seizure of vo\igt by Hitler, and the iTazi
Party, and years before the occurrence of the a cts of
aggression here charged and arc contemporaneous conclu
sions regarding the intent, moaning, and scope of the
Treaty.

Is there personal responsibility for those '.vho plan,

prepare and initiate aggressive•ars and invasions?

The

defendants have ably and earnestly urged that heads of

states and officials thereof cannot be held personally

responsible for initiating or w aging aggressive v;ars and
invasions because no penalty had been previously proscribed
for such acts.
fallacious,

History, however, reveals that this view is

Prcdprlck the Great was summoned by the

Imperial Council to appear at Regensburg and answer, under
throat of banishment, for his alleged breach of the public
peace in invading ,3axony. '

'Then ITapolcon, in alleged violation of his interna

tional agrocment, sailed frcmfillba to regain by force the
Imperial Crovm of Rranco, the nations of Europe, including

many Gorman Princes, in solemn conclave, denounced him,

outlawing him as an enemy and disturber' of the peace, musy

terod their armies, and on the battlefield of Waterloo,
enforced their decroo and applied tho sentence by banishing

him to St. Ilclona.

By those actions they recognized and

-13-

declared that personal punishment could he properly in-

"Lipon a head of state ivho violated an xnberna tional
agreement and resorted to aggressive war.
But even if history furnished no exaraples, vr e v/ould
have no hesitation in holding that those who prepare, plan
or initiate aggressive Invasions and vr age aggressive wars

and those •'.iho knowingly participate therein are subject to
trial, and if convicted, to pimishment.

By the i'^ellogg-Brland Treaty, Germany, as v/ell as

practically every other civilized country of the v;orld,
renounced war as an instrumentality of governmental policy.

The treaty was entered into for the benefit of all.

It

recognised the fact that once war breaks out, no one can
foresee how far or to v/hat extent the flames will spread,

and that, in this rapidly shrinking world, it affects the
interest

of

all.

ITo one would question the right of any signatory to
i

use its armed forces to halt the violator in his tracks

and to rescue the country attacked.

Nor v/ould there be

any question but that, V'hen this was successfully accom

plished, sanctions could be applied a gainst the guilty nation.
\7hy then can they not be applied to the individuals by whose
decisions, cooperation and implementation the unlav/ful war

or Invasion was initiated and vjaged?

T^ust the punishment

always fall on those who were not personally responsible?
ray the humble citizen, :;ho knew nothing of the reasons

for his country's.action, who may have been utterly deceived

by ?-ta propaganda, be subject to death or v/ounds in battle.

-14-

held as a prisoner of v/sr, see his home destroyed hy

artillery or from the air, he compelled to see his

-wife and family suffer privations and hardships;

may

the owners and workers in industry see it destroyed,

their merchant fleets sunk, the mariners drowned or

interned; may Indemnities result v/hich must he derived
from the taxes paid by the ignorant and the innocent;

Hay all this occur and those v;ho wore actually respons
ible escape?

The only rationale which would sustain the con

cept that :the responsible shall escape while the innocent

public suffers, is a result of the old theory that "the

King can do no v/rong" and that "v/ar is the sport of Kings".
lii/e may point out furthun that the Geneva Conven

tion relating to Rules of Land ^"arfare and the Treatment
if Prisoners of '"ar provide no punishment for t he individ
uals who violate those rules, but it cannot be questioned
V

that he who murders a prisoner of war is liable to punish
ment ,

To permit such immunity Is to shroud international
law in a mist of unroality.

We reject it and hold that

those who plan, prepare. Initiate andw age aggressive
wars and invasions, and those who knowingly, consciously

and roaponsibily participate therein violate international

law and may be tried, convicted and punished for their
acts •

-15-

The "Tu '^ueque" Doctrines

The defendants have offered

testimony ands upported it hy official documents v/hich
tend to estahlish that the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics entered into a treaty with Germany In August,

1941, T?hich contains secret clauses whereby not only did
Russia consent to Hitler's invasion of Poland, but at
least tacitly agreed to send its ovm armed forces against
that nation, and by it could demand and obtain its shareof tho loot, and was given a free hand to sv;allow the

little Baltic States with whom it had thon existing nonaggression treaties.

The defense asserts that Russia,

bbing itself an aggressor and an accomplice to Hitler's

aggression, v/as a p^rty and an accomplice to at least
one of tho aggressions charged in this Indictment, namely

that against Poland, and therefore was legally inhibited
from signing tho London Charter and enacting Control

Council Law llo. 10, and consequently both the Charter and
lav; are invalid and no prosecution can be maintained
undor them.

The justifications, if any, which the Soviet
Union may claim to have had for its actions in this
respect, were not represented to this Tribunal.

But if

wc assume, arguendo, that Russia's octionwas wholly

untenable and its g^ilt as deep as that of the Third
Reich, nevertheless, this cannot, in law, avail the
defendants or lessen the 'guilt of those of the Third

Roich v;ho were themselves responsible.

Neither the Lon

don iCharter nor Control Council Lav; No. 10 did more than

declare existing international law regarding aggrosalvo

-16-.
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Wars cind invasions. The Charter and Cantrol Council
Lav; rTo. 10 merely defined what offenses against inter

national lav/ should bo the subject of judicial inquiry,
formed the international Hilitary Tribunal, and author

ized the sirrnatory powers to set up additional Tribunals
to try those charged v/ith couimitting crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

^

But even if it wore true that the London Charter
and Control Council Lav; No. 10 arc legislative acts making that a crime which before
the defense argument be valid?

as not so. recognized, would
It has never been suggested

that a lav; duly passed becomes ineffective when it trans

pires that one of the legislators whose vote enacted it
was himself guilty of the aamo practice or that he him-

*

^

self intended, in the future, to violate the law.

%
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COUNT ONH]

CRIi^ES AGAIU3T ?£ACS

The defendants VJEIZSASCKER, KEPPLER, BOHLE, 'vOSKlOTJ,

RITTER, ERBI^liU'^NSDORFF, VEESENMYER, LAMl^RS, STUCKART, DARKS,
i-'jjI33NER, DIETRICH, BERGER, SCHELLENBERG, SCHWSRIN-KROSIGK,

KQjijRivER and PL^IGER are charged with having narticipated in
the initiation aiid invasion of other countries and wars of

aggression, including but not limited to planning, preparation,

initiation and waging of wars of aggression and wars in viola

tion of international treaties, agreements and assurances.

The invasions and wars referred to end the da.tes of their
initiations are alleged to have been as follows:
Austria

12 March 19.-^8

Czechoslovakia

1 October 19A8 and 15 March 191^9

Poland.
United Kingdom an"" France

1 September 1959
? September 19-*^9

Denmark and Norway

9 April 1940

Belgium, Netherlands ^nd Luxembourg

10

1940

Yugoslpvia. an'' Greece
6 April 1941
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
June 1941
United Sta"^es of America
11 December 1941

The proeecuticn dismissed t^is count as to the defend
ants BOHLE, ERDIvJiNNSDORFF and MEI33NER.
Notwithstanding the fact that the International ^''^ilitary Tribunal and several of these Tribunals have decided

that the Third Reich was guilty of aggressive wars and
invasions,

we h£.-ve re-examined this question because of

the

made

claim

by

the

defense

evidence reveals that Germany
It should

be

made

clear,

was

that

not

however,
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newly

the
that

discovered

aggressor.
this

defense

'

is not auTomlttcd by all of the defendants,

ror example,

the defendant VlHIZSAECISEx^. fi-'eely admits that these acts
v/erc a^gneasiona.

The argument is based on the alleged injustices and
harsh tarnls of the Versailles Treaty, '.vhich it is claimed

Y:as imposed upon Germany by force; that agreements made
under duress are not binding, and, in attempting to rid
itself of the bonds thus tlirust upon it, Germany v/as com

pelled to use force and in s o doing cannot be judged an
aggressor. Unless the defense has sufficient legal merit
necessitating our so doing, a review of the treaty and the
reasons v.hich underlie it and its terms, v;ith a view to

determining the accuracy of"these claims, would expand our

opinion beyond permissible limits.

In our opinion, however,

there is no substance to the defense, irrespective of the

quGstlon whether the treaty was just or v.1acther it was
imposed by duress.

\7e deem it unnecessary to determine either the truth
of these claims or ?;hether one, upon whom the victor, hy

force of arms, has imposed a treaty on unjust or unduly
harsh terms, may therefore reject the treaty and, by force
of arms, attempt to regain that v/hlch it believes has boon
wrongfully wrested from it.

If, arg^uendo, both propositions were conceded, neverthe
less both are irrelevant to the question confronting us

here.

In any event the timo must arrive when a given status,

irrespective of the means ivhei'oby it came into being, must
be considered as fixed, at loact so far as a resort to an
aggressive means of correction is concerned.
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v;hen Hitlsr solcinnly informed the world thet so

far as territorial questions were concorncd Germany had

ho claims, and by means of solemn treaty assured Austria,

Franco, Czechoslovakia and Poland, that he had no terri
torial demands to be made upon them, and v.hcn he entered
into treaties of peace and non-aggrossion v/ith them, the
status of repose and fixation was reached.

These assm^ancea

v/ere given and these treaties entered into v/hen there could
be no claim of existing compulsion.

Thereafter aggressive

acts against the territories of these nations bocame breaches
of international lav;, prohibited by the provisions of the
1

Kcllogg-Brland Treaty to v/hich Germany had become a volun
tary signatory'".

Ho German could thereafter look upon war or invasion

to recover part or all of the territories of v;hich Germany
had been deprived by the Treaty of Versailles as other
than aggressive.

To excuse aggressive acts after these

treaties and assurances took place is merely to assort
that no treaty and no assurance by Germany is binding
and that the pledged word of Germany is valueless.

It

is, therefore, particularly vmfortunate both for the
present :nd the future of the German people, that such a
defense should be raised as i t tends to create doubt when,

if at all, the nations of the world can place reliance upon
Gorman international obligations.

Czochoslovaklai

On IG October

1929, Germany entered into

a treaty with Czechoslovakia, Article I of Part 1 of which

provides that all disputes of any kind between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, which it may not be possible to settle
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amicably by normal moans of diplomacy, should be sub
mitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or

to a permanent court of international justice, and it
v;as agreed that the disputes referred to include those
mentioned in Article XIlI of the Covenant of the League
of ITations.
^

On 11 and 12 I.Iarch

•

1938, the Hitler government

r.e-assurod Czechoslovakia that the developments in Austria
,vz-duld in no ^vay have any detrimental influence upon the
rolatlons of the G-orman Reich and that state, emphasizing
the continued earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to
improve those mutual rblations.

The

Czechs v;ero so

cssu.rGd hy Gocring rho gave his '•'\'iovd of honor'', and by
von ITeurathjthen iPorcign 1-Iinistor, v/ho officially assured
the Czech Minister, Mastny, on behalf of Hitler, that

Germany still considered herself bound by the GermanCzech Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in

October

1925,

von Mackonson of the Foreign Office

gave further assurances that the clarification of the
Austrian situation would tend to improve Gcrman-Czochoslovakian
relations.

Austria?

On 21 May

1935, Germany assured Austria that it

neither intended nor wished to intervene in the domestic

affairs of th?t State, or annex, or attach that country

to hor.

On 11 July

1935, Hitler entered into an agreement

with Austria containing, among other things, the provision

that the German government roco^:nized the full sovereignty
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of the Federal State of Austria and in the sense of

the pronouncement of the German leader and Chancellor
of 21 !.:ay

1935.

Bv the Treaty of Versailles, Article- 40, Germany

aclaiowledged and agreed to respect strictly the independ
ence of Austria i^ithln the .boundaries which might be

fixod in the treaty between the states and the principal
Allied and Associated pov/ors, and further agreed that

this independence should be inalienable., except by the
consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Polands

On 15 October

1925,, Germany, at Locarno, entered

into a l^reaty with Poland which recited that the. contracting
parties were equally resolved to maintain peace between them
by assuring the po aceful sot'oleTiient of dificrences 'whu.ch
might arise between the two countries and declared i/hat
respect for the rights established by troauy or resulting
from the law of nations was obligatory for international

tribunals, that the rights of a state could not be modified
save with its consent, and that all disputes of every hind
betv;oen Germany and Poland, which it v; a a not possible to
settle amicably by normal methods of diplomacy, should be
submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or

to an intemational court of ;]u3tice.

On 26 January 1934 Gorniany and Poland signed a non-

aggression pact which provided, among other things, that
undor no circumstances would either party proceed to use

force for the purpose of settling disputes.

...

On 7 March, 1936, Hitler announcca;
territorial demands to tnako in Europe",

"V/e have no
On 20 February

1938, Hitler, in a speech, said:
"In our relations v/ith the state with

which v;e had had perhaps the greatest differences,

not only has there hoon a dotonto, hut in the
ccurso of years there has been a constant improve
ment in relations • • .The Polish state respects
the national conditions in this state and both

the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish

rights," And so the way to an imderstanding has'
been successfully paved, an understanding VJhich,

beginning v/ith Danzig has today,'in spite of the
attempts of many mischief makers, finally suc
ceeded in taking the poison out of the relations

of Germany and Poland and transforming them into
a sincere and friendly cooperation,"
On 26 September

1938, Hitler saids

"In Poland there ruled not a democracy but

a man, and with him X succeeded in precisely tv/elve
months in coming to an agreement which, for ten
years, to begin v;ith, entirely removed the danger
of conflict.

V/e arc all convinced that this agree

ment will bring lasting pacification,"
On 24 Hovombor. 1938, Hcitel issued orders based on
Ilitlor^s instructions of 21 October that preparations be

made to enable German troops to occupy the Free City of
Danzig by surprise.

Denmark and ITorwa;/;

On 31 Hay 1939 Germany and Denmark

entered into a non-aggreasion pact in which they agreed!
"That in no case shall either country resort

to v/ar or any other use of force, one against
the other,"

On 28 August

1939, the defendant V/EIZSAECKaH assured

the Danish Minister of Germany's intention to abide by the
terms of this Pact.

On r2 September

1939, Gei-many assured Norv/oy that

in viev; of tiie friendly relations existing betv/een them
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it would, under no circumatcncGs, prejudice the invlola-

"bilit:" or neutrality of Hprway, and on 6 October

1939,

Germany aGcin assured ITorway that It had never had any
conflicts of interest oreven points of controversy with

the northern states, "and neither has she any today,"
and that Sweden and Horway had both been offered non^

aggression pacts and refused them solely because they
did not feel themselves threatened in any v;ay.

Belgium;

On 13 January

1937, Hitler stated that Germany

had, "and hero I repeat, solcKinly" given assurances time
and again that, for instance, bet""cen Germany and Franco

there cannot bo any humanly concoivablo points of contro
versy; that the Gorman government had given the assurance

to Belgium and Holland that it was prepared to recognize

and gua.rantco the Inviolability of those territories, ,
This was roitorotcd on 26 August

1939, and v/as again

rcnev/ed on 6 October, of that 3'oar.

At that very timo,

by Hitler's order, the chiefs of the German army were

engaged in planning and preparing the invasions of those
countries.

Yugoslavia s

On 28 April

1938, the German government,

through the defendant V/HIlSxilCIlZR, stated that having
become reunited with Austria, it would consider the

frontiers of Italy, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Lichtcnstein
✓

and Hungaryss inviolable, and that the Yugoslavian

government had been informed by authoritative German
circles that German policy had no aims beyond Austria,
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anfl that the Yugoslavian Prontior v;ould, in no case,

he assaultccl,

Y/hen in'iSoJiteniher, 1939, Heeren, hinistor

to Yugoslavia, reported that there v/as increased

anxiety there ower tj©rmany*s military intentions and
requested that some kind of announcement he made to

alleviate local fears, the defendant Y/EIZSAECIYS replied
that in viev/ of Hitler's recent speech declaring that^

Germany's houndaries to the west and south v/ere final,

y

it would not appear necessary to aay more unless new
occasions for reissuing reassuring communiques to Yue-^-

^

slavia should arise.

On 6 Octoher

1939, Hitler gave Yugoslavia the

following asauranco %

".After the completion of- the Anschluss

I informed Yugoslavia that from nov- on the
houndaries with this.country would also ho
an inviolahle one, and thatwc only desire
to live in friendship and peace with her.

V/hat reliance could ho placed on Gorman pledges

is revealed hy the minutes of the Hitler-Ciano meeting
of 12 Aiogust. 1939, where Hitler stated:
"Generally speaking, it would ho hest

to liquidate the'pseudo-neutrals one after

another-. This is fairly easily done if the
Axis partner protects the roar of the other
v/ho is just finishing oi^f one of the uncer
tain neutrals and vice verse. Italy might
consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral.

gusslc:

On 23 August

1939, Germany entered into a non-

aggression treaty nith nussia, providing for arbitral commlsions in case of any dispute and on the same day ontsred

into a secret protocol with tho Soviet Union that, in the
event of n tGrritorlal and political rearrangement in the
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ran

\ \i i I I'l iHlTiffli r

11 Mmi ' i ii

rt\

areas "belonging to Finland, Estonia and Lithuania, the
northern boundaries of Lithuania should rcpreaont the

boundaries of spheres of influence betv;ccn Germany and
Russia, and that the spheres of Germany and Paissia in •
Poland should be bound by the rivers Narcv/, Bistula
^

,

and San, and declared Germany's complete political dis
interest in the Soviet claims in Bessarabia,
*

On 28 September

^ 4

1939, Germany and the Soviet Union

entered into a boundary and friendship agreement which
✓

divided Poland botv.'oen them, end firod their mutual houndarics, and on the same date entered into a soorot supple4

mentar^'" protocol which amended that of August 23, putting
the Lithuanian state within the sphere of Soviet influence

and Lublin and parts of V/arsaw in the German sphere.
On the same day the two nations entered into a

further agreement declaring that Germany and Russia v/ould
direct their common efforts jointly, and with other friendly
powers if occacicn arises, tov:ard putting an end to the war
betv.'ocn Germany and England and Franco, and that if those
4

efforts remained fruitless, this failure would demonstrate

the fact that Ln.gland and Franco wore rosponsiblo for the
conditions of the war, and Germany and Russia would engage
in mutual consultations r/ith regard to necessary measures.

Such wore the treaties,

nevertheless, as was found

by the Ii^itcrnational Military tribunal, as early as the
late sumer of 1940, Germany began to make preparations for
on attack on the Soviets in spite of the non-aggrcssion
Poet,
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The German Ambassador in rioscov; reported that

the Govict Union ?;ould nso to war only if attacked.

Russia had fulfilled not only its obliniations \xnder

the political treaty, hut those arising out of the
commorcial treaty.

The claim now made that Russia intended to attack
Germany is without foundation.

It expressed concern over

the large German troop conccntrationsih iRumania, which
were of such size that the German explanation that they
wore intended to prevent the British from establishing
b Saloniklan front v/as obviously false, but there is no
substantial evidence that Russia intended to attack

Germany, - its concern was -that it might become the
attacked.

In addition tb all spocchos, assurances and treaties,

Germany had signed the kellogg-Bricnd Pact, which not only

proscribed aggressivewars between nations, but abandoned
' war as an instrument of governmental policy and substituted
conciliation and arbitration for it.

One of its most

important and far-reaching provisions was that it implicitly
authorized the other nations of the world to take such

measures as they might dcem^proper or necessary to punish
the transgressor.

In short, it placed the aggressor outside

the society of nations.

The Rollogg-Briand Pact, hoii/eVer,

did not attempt to cither prohibit or limit the right of

self-defense, but it is implicit, both in its word and
spirit, that he who violates the treaty is subject to
disciplinary action on the part of the other signauories
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snd thc.t he who initiates aggressive war loses the

right to claim self-defense a'jainst those who seek to
enforce the Treaty.

This v/as merely the embodiment in

international law, of a long established principle of
criminal law;

•'There can be no self-defense o'-iainst self-defense.''
(I T^^/harton Criminal Law, 12th Edition, p. 180)
The Indictment charges that German aggression

started with the forcible annexation of Austria.

not urged that this

It is

action arose because of any fear of

aggression by that state, or that it had planned or pro
posed to join any other state in any aggrossiye action

against Germany.

That Hitler planned to seize both Austria

and Czechoslovakia v/ithout regard to the v/ishes of those

people is clear from his statements made at the famous
secret conferences of 5 Ho^cmber

1937, and 23 November

1939.

The Austro-IIungarian Empire ^"as dissolved at the
end of the Pirtt World War, and by the Treaty of Versailles

Austria became an independent and sovereign state.

At that

time, and at least during most of the time of the Weim^ir
Republic, there was a strong desire on the part of Austria
to join Germany.

Notwithstanding attempts to conceal ultimate objec

tives and palpable deceptive disclaimers by official
Germany and by the Nazi Party of any desire to interfere
in Austrian affairs, it became obvious that by fair means
or foul the Hitler regime intended and proceeded to sub
sidize, direct and control the Austrian members of the
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Party, and thrt those offorts v;ere directed to^-ard the
annexation of t ho country.

I-To agreement vas t^iado which

v/as not violated, none wore mace vith any intention to
t

^

ahide hy them, and tho same technique of propaganda,
coercion and violence was followed

had "boon successful in Germany.

in Austria which

In tho later stages

when it v/as felt that the plum v/as ripe ond about to fall,

and" when tlic possible intervention of other powers still
existed, a purported repudiation of Austrian radicals v/as

put forth, " not because of disapproval of what they wore
doing, but to oc.mouflagc the program.

^'hilo it is now asserted that an ovorv/hclming

majority of Austricns acccptod and were enraptured by
tho Anschluss, neither Jlitlcr ncr his crew could con
tain themselves to await what they now term was the
inevitable, nor run the hazard of a plebiscite, but

Seyss-Inquart v/as forced on Gchusclmigg and made liinistcr

of the Interior vhcro ho could control the police and
finally an ultimatum was served on the A\istrian govern
ment, and the troops marched in.

hut before a German

soldier crossed tho border, armed bands of ITational Soc
ialist SA and SS units under Gorman control and orders
'

and leaders, had taken possession of tho city of Vienna,

seized ths reins of government, and ousted the leaders of

the Austrian state and placed them under guard.
In view of the size of the German army, the dispro

portion in manpower and military resources, no hope of
. succossful resistance existed, Austria fell without a

stvMSQlc, and the Anschluss v/as accomplished. It was
follov;ed "by the proscription, .persecution and internement in concentration camps of those v/ho had resisted
the Hazi movement, and the policy there pursued was iden
tical with those which had followed the seizure of power
in Germany.

That the invasion wa«3 aggressive and that Hitler
✓

follov/ed a campaign of docoit, threats and coercion, is
hsyond question. Tho Vv'holo story is one of duplicity
and overwhelming force. It was a part of a program doclarod to his ovai circlo, and wrs the first stop in the
well-ooncoived and carefully planned oam'-algn of aggres

sion, .Austria first,Czechoslovakia second, and Poland
third, while visions of the further aggresaivo aggrandize
ment wore dangled before tho eyes of the German loaders,
neither those acts nor the invasion by Gorman armed

forces c.an bo said to bo pacific moans or a poa.coful

and orderly process within the meaning of the Preamble
of the Kellogg-Sriand Pact, and violated both its letter
ond spirit.

It must ho borne in mind that the term "invasion''
connotes and implies the use of force.
cases the force used was military force.

In the instant
In the course

of construction of this definition, v/e certainly may

consider the v'ord "invasion" in its usually accepted

sense,

lo may assume that the enacting authorities also

used the term in a like sense.

In V/ebstei^s

CJnabridged

Dictionary, we find the following definition of invasions
"Invasions 1. Act of invading, esp., a
warlike or hostile entrance into the
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poasGSsions or domains of another, - the
Incursion of an
plunder."

army for conquest or

The evidence v/ith respect to both Austria

and Czechoslovakia indicates that the invasions were hostile

and agGrcaslve,

An invasion of this character is clearly

such an act ofv;ar as is tantamount to, and maybe treated

as, a declaration of v/ar.

It is not reasonable to assume

that an act of '-ar, in the natiire of an invasion, ^ihereby

conquest and plundec are achioved without resistance, is
to bo given more favorable consideration then a similar
invasion, \7hich may h ve mot v/ith some military rosistanc
The fact that the aggressor v/as hero able to so overawe

the invaded countries, does not detract in the slightest

from tho enormity of the aggression, in reality perpetrat
ed.

The invader here employed an act of war.

of v;ar was an Instrument of national policy.

This act
Tribunal V

in Case Ho. 12 (The Hi^^h Command case) in the course of
its judgment said:

"'As a preliminary to that we deem it
necessary to give a brief consideration to
the nature and characteristics of'" or.

ib

need not attempt a definition that is all
inclusive and all exclusive.

It is sufficient

to say that wae; is the exerting of violence
by one state or politically organized body,

against another.

In other words, it is the

imnlomontation of a political policy by moans

o/violcnco.

-Vars arc contests by force be

tween political units but the policy that
brings about their initiation is made and
the actual waging of them is done by individ
uals. V/hat we have aeid thus ibr is equally

applicable to a just as to an unjust war, to
the initiation ofan aggressive and, there

fore criminal war, os to the waging of defen
sive and, therefore, legitimate war against

criminal aggression.

The^pointv/e stress is

that war activity is the implementation of a

predetermined national policy.
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"Likev/iso, an invasion of one stste "b:/
another Is tho mplementation of the national
policy of the invaciln,^ state '077 force even

thou!7h the invaded'st a-to, due- to fear or a
sense of the futility/ Of resistance in tho
face of superior force, cdopts r policy of
non-resistance and thus prevents the occurronce of any actual combat,"

(Underscoring silpp^liecl)
•o hold that the invasion of Austria v/as ng.^rcssivG

and a crime a gainst peace v:ithin the meanlnr; of Control
Council Lav/ No,

10.

V/e have already quoted Nitlor^s v/ords as to his
plans re^ardin" the Czochoslovcklan state.
tives v;cro fixed but the tactics of

The objec

accomplishment v/ere

elastic and dopcndcd upon tho necessities and conveniences
of time and circumstance.

This v/as no more than the dis

tinction botv/ecn militar"' stratoj^y and tactics.
is tho over-all plan which docs not vary.

the techniques

Strategy

Tactics are

of action which adjust themselves to the
^

*

circumstances of weather, terrain, supply and resistance.

The Nazi plans to destroy the Czech state remained con
stant.

But v/here, vhen and how to strike depended upon

circumstances as the^:' arose,.

The evidence establishes beyond all question or
doubt that Germany, under Hitler, never made a promise

v/hlch it intended to keep, that it promised anything and'

everything v/hencver it thought promises would lull sus

picion, end promised

peace on tho eve of initlatln£v war.

vhen in 1958 Germany invaded Austria it was in no

danger from that state or its neighbors.

Then it h^d

swallov^ed the Austrian Federal State, Germany moved against
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Czechoslovakia, using the question gf

Sudeten Germans

as a inere excuse Tor its demands a^'^iunichj

it c omplgued

its organisation of and assumed even greater control over
Henlein and his party, v/hich it had secretly organized and
subsidized, and directed him to reject any Czech ej-forts
of composition and compromise, and to constantly increase
his

demands.

At hunich it put forth demands for the annexation
of the Sudetenland when theretofore it had not suggested

it.

Its Foreign Office had instructed its representatives

to inform Lord Runciman that unless his report regarding
the Sudeten question vas favorable to the German wishes,

dire international I'esults would follov/;

after Lunich

it promised and declared that it had no further ideas of

aggression against the remnants of the Czech state v/nen,
at the very moment, those plans were in existence, and

were x'eady to be matured.

It fomented, subsidized and

supported the Slovakian movement for Independence in the
face of its assurance of friendship with the Czechs,

.hen

Tiso seemed to hesitate, Hitler made it clear that unless
this action vras taken, he would lose interest in the olo-

vaklans,

lie summoned the aged and ill Hacha to Berlin and

threatened his country with war and the destruction of its

ancient capital, Prague, by aerial warfare.

He started his

armed forces on the march into Bohemia and Loravia before
he had coerced Hacha into submission.

The announcement that its relations with Poland were
excellent and that peace was assured,.came when plans Tor
the invasion of Poland wore already decided upon.

MU..

It made

non-aggrosaion pacts, gave assurances to Denmark and
Norway, at a tims v;hen the question of occupying these
countries for the purpose of obtaining bases v;as being
considered.

It assured Holland,Belgiutn and Luxenibourg

that it would respect their noutrolity,

when it had al

ready planned to violate it, and only awaited a pro
pitious moment so to do.

'

VJhen Germany fomentod and subsidized the Hcnloin

Sudoton Ilovemcnt, it knew that Czechoslovakia desired
peace and not war.

It used the technique of a gent provo

cateur, both in Czechoslovakia and again in Poland to
create incidents upon v/nioh it could seize as an excuse
for military action.

Hitler's aggression against Russia' as not induced
by foar of : attack, but because Russia had material re
sources for which Hitler hankered.

How, at th^t time, any

country could have had the slightest faith in Germany's
v/ord is beyond comprehension,

The record is one of abyssmal duplicity which carried
in its train death, suffering and loss to practically every

people in the world; it brought ruin to Gormany and a worldr
wide distrust in the ability of its people to govern them

selves as a peace-loving and u' cful nation.

Because of t his

record the road back is long and arduous and besot v;ith
dij?flculty.

The attempt which had been made to create the fic
tion and fable that the Third Reich acted in self-defense
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V

and v;ai£ justified in its .? eta tov/ards its neighbors,
has no foundation and is,

the G-ornrn people,

in fact,

c disservice to

"'e believe it is an effort to lay.

the groundwork for a resurgence of the ideologj which
brought untold suffering to the v-or Id and ruin to the
Gerraan nation.

Until the seizure of pov/er, the V/estcrn Uorld,
on the ^holc, looked with s;^i-ipathy and satisfaction on
the efforts of the German people to regain the place in
the family of nations to v/hich it

as entitled, and which

\

it had lost.

^

They suspected, even if they did not laiow,

that Germany, from the very day that it signed the Ver

sailles Treaty, had secretly violated its terms as to

disarmament.

But vhile suspicion of Germany's good faith

existed in some circles, a strong hope and faith prevailed

that the German nation would achieve a free and prosperous
society.

It VIas th^. ilazi regime and its ready acceptance by
the Gorman people which brought the world to arms in de

fense against on ideology and a dictator whose programs
and aims knew no bounds,

/ifter having rcliod upon Germany's pledge 4it li-unich,
and found it worthless, having observed the incr^.asing

demands upon and its intransigence towards Poland, it is
not surprising that Franco and Fngland found it necessary

to enter into a trcat^T- of aasistanco v/ith Poland, and
there is neither fact nor substance to the contontion that

that treaty gave Poland a blank check,

G-crraany v/as so in

formed by Prnnce and Ungland> as v/ero the Polos,

ITo juatifIcat-ion can, or has boon offered, for the
Invasion of Denmark, other then the pseudo one of mili

tary necessity.

The Danes had maintained their neutral

ity and had Divcn no offense to Germany.

It was helpless

and resistance hopeloss, as the gallant, but futile re
sistance of the PalacG Guards jndicctcd.

But as v/o shall

hofoaftcr discuss, military necessity is never available

to an aggressor aa a defense for invading the rights of a
neutral.

Korways

The defense insists that the invasion of Iiorv;ay

Y/as justified because of French end British plans to land
expeditionary forces there, in -violation of Hpn-egian neu
trality, and therefore, Germany acted in s ..If-dcfenso.

may repeat the statement that, having initiated aggressive

wars, v;hidi brought* ?dngland and rrancc to the aid of the
Polos, Germany forfeited the right to claim self-dofcnao,
but there arc other and cogent facts which make the dcfonsc
unavailable.

Long before the discovery of alleged British and
French plans, and before any such plans existed, the

Third Belch commenced t.o support an - , subs idizo 'Quisling
and his movement for t ho purpose of gaining control of the

ITorwogian 'iovcrnmcnt and therefore, of Norr'a^-.
✓

It made no

♦

inquiry whether rlorv/ay could, or would, protect its neu

trality against Britain and France, and the German official
documents disclose that it avoided such an approach and

kept its plans accrob because of the fear that the other
neutral nowrors would intervene end institute discussions
directed toward maintaining Lorwcgi':^n neutrality ^and pre-

uitlng that country from becoming a theatre ofwar.

von
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Finally the desiralDility of o"bt2ining air and
other has OS in Norway v/as a motivating factor for

the invasion and this was pointed out iDy Raedcr and
Doenitz as early as o Octohcr

1939#

"/e hold thot the invasion of .Norway was aggressive,

that the warwhlch Oermany initiated and waged there vra's
without lawful justification or excuse, and is a crime
under international law and Control Council Law No# 10#

Luxembourg;

No justification or excuse is offered regard

ing the invasion of Luxembourg other than military conven
ience.

No claim is made that Luxembourg had in any way

violated its neutrality.

In fact, it had not.

The Gorman

invasion v/as aggressive, v/ithout^ legal justification or
excuse.

Belgium and the Netherlands; That both of these nations

v/ere pathetically eager to avoid being drawn into the hdlocaust is established beyond

doubt.

That they had every

reason to be distrustful of Germany's word is equally clear.

The testimony offered by the defense discloses that '/when
I

the Third Reich assured "liio Low Countries that it Intended
to and would observe its treaty obligations, and had no

hostile intentions, tho intention to invade had already

been determined upon and was onlg" awaiting a favorable
moment.

An attempt has been made to assert that the invasion
of Belgium was justified because of conversations between the
French and Belgian Military Staffs.
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The Belgian government

\

had "been apprchcnsivo for riany months that Germany
v'ould use its territory as a moans to attack tho French

flank.

German propcrations to invade Belsiiim had "been

matured lon'3 sinco, and were hardly a secret.

Bolsium

was properly concerned regarding her defense and possible
aid if she V/ere invaded, and her conversations with the

French and English were addressed to this alone.

Hitler's

I

attack was without justification or excuse, and consti

tuted a crime a gainst peace.

As to Holland, there is

even less ground for justification and excuse.
*

Yugoslavia and Greeces

✓

Germany's Axis partner, Italy,

initiated an aggressive attack against Greece v/h'ich the

defense docs not attempt to justify, but assorts that this

v/as undertaken without previous consultations or a groement
vdth Hitler.

This apjxars to bo true.

But Germany had

been advised by its representativos in Rome of the immi
nence of the attack and its Foreign Office knevr of Greek

apprehensions regarding tho sane, and It intentionally
displayed alleged ignorance and rciused to take any action
to prevent it.

Tho German excuse for the attack on Greece

is that England had landed certain troop elements in aid
of Froece*s defense against Italy and that as a matter of

self-defense Germany v;as compelled to intervene, but an

aggressor may not loose the dogs of war and thereafter
nlecd self-defense.
The only Justification offered for the German inva^i-

Sim of Yugoslavia is the coup d'«8tat v;hich oyerthrev/ the
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govcrnrnent which had signed the anti-Cor.iintern Pact, and
the fear that Yugoslavia v'ould remain neutral only until

such time as it night join the ranks of G-ermany^a enemies.

The unquestioned fact is that every country, and par
ticularly those v,h ich lay along or near German boundaries,
v/as fully av.'aro that German actions in Austria , Czechoslo
vakia and Poland wore a ggrcsslvo and unjustified, and that

in attacking and invading, Hitler had broken not only the

provisions of the '^ello.gg-kriand Pact, but the pledges
which he

had given to those countries;

approved of Germsny^s rction and the

each fully dis-

,

question which lay

in their minds was v'hcrc t'lc next blovr v-ould f a l l .

To

thinl- there is no doubt whstsccvcr thet every countrg' in
Europe, except its Axis partners, hoped for Gorman defeat

as the one insurance for its ov.n cafoty, but such hopes
cannot Justify the German action against them. •
The

claim of solf-dcfcnsc

doctrine is

never available

tions, who are aggressors.

is without merit.

either to

individuals

That
or na

The robber or the murderer

crnnot claim self-defense in attacking the police to avoid
arrest or diose who, he fear's, disapprove of his criminal
conduct and hope that lie will be apprehended and brought to

JusticG.
The Invasion of Austria, the

invasion of Bohemia

and horavia, and the attack on Poland wer^ in violation
f

of international law and in each case, by resorting to

armed force, Germany violated tho Hellogg-Brirnd Pact.
It thereby became an international outlaw and cvorg" peaceable

nation had the right to opposo it vdthout itself becoming
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an aggressor, to help the attacked and join with those
who ha.d provlously come to the aid of the victim.

The

doctrine of self-defense and military necessity was

never availahle to Germany as a matter of international
law, in viov; of its prior violations of that law.
United States of Americas

That the United States abandoned

a neutral attitude toward Germany long before Germany de

clared war is v/ithout qusetion.

It hopdd for Germany*a _

defeat,gave aid and support to Great Britain, and to the
governments of the countries which Germany had overrun.

4

Its- entire course of conduct for over a year before 11
December

1911, was v/holly Inconsistent with neutrality

and that it had no intention of permitting Germany^s vic

tory, even though this led to hostilities, became increas

ingly apparent.

^

However, in so doing, the United States did

not become an aggressor; it'•'as

acting within its inter

national rights in hampering and hindering, v;ith the
9

i

intention of insuring the clefeg-t of the nation vhich had

v/rongfully, without excuse and in violation of its treaties
and obligations, embarked on a coldly calculated program

of aggression and war.

But such intent, purpose

and action

does not remove the aggressive character of the German
declaration ofv.'ar of 11 December

1941.

A nation which engages in aggressive war invites

the other nations of the v:orld to take measures, includ

ing force, to halt the invasion and to punish the aggressor,
and if by reason thereof the aggressor declares war on a
third nation, the original aggression carries over and gives
the character of aggression to the second and succeeding wars.
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, Htairdl.

We hold that the invasions and v/ars described in

paragraph tv/o of the Indictment a gainst Austria., Czecho
slovakia, Poland, the United Kingdom and prance, Denmark
and ITorv/ay, Belgium, the ITetherlands and Luxembourg,

Yugoslavia and Ureece, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and the United States of America v:ere unlaw
ful and aggressive, violated international law, and were
crimes within the definition of the London Charter and

Control Council Law Uo, 10,
Our task is to determine which, if any, of the
defendants, knowing there -as an intent to so initiate

and wage aggressive war, consciously participated in
either plans, preparations, initiations of those wars,

or so iQiovring, participated or aided in carrying them
on.

Obviously, no man may be condemned for fighting in

what he believes is the defense of his native land, even

though his belief be mistaken,

for can he be ejqsected

to undertake an independent investigation to determine
whether or not the cause for which he fights is the re

sult of an aggressive act of his ov.ti government.

One

can be guilty only v/liere Imowledge of aggression in fact
exists, and it is not sufficient that he have suspicions
that the

is aggressive.

Any othe."* test of guilt v^ould involve a standard

of conduct both impracticable and unjust.

Criminal Responsibility?

Article II, Section 2 of Control

Council Law No, 10, provides that?

"Any person rrithout regard to" nati onality
or the capacity in v/hich he s ctecl, ia deemed to
have comraittsd a crime c s defined in Paragraph

•

1 of this Article if he was (a) a principal, or
(b) v/as an accessory to the commission of'any
such crime or ordered or abetted the same, or

.

(c) took a consenting part therein

•

Therofore, all those who v/ere either principals or
accessories before or after the fact, are criminally respon-

siblc,although the degree of criminal responsibility may
vary in accordance \,'ith the nature of his acts.

Under the provisions of Section 4, Article II,

"The I'act that any person acted pursuant
to the order of his government or of a'superior
does not free him from responsibility for a
crime, but maybe considered in mitigation."
In the realm of tho ordinary criminal lav/, one v/ho

conceals the fact that a crime lias boen committed or gives

falso testimony as to the facts for the purpose of giving
some advantage to the perpetrator, not on account of fear

but for the saliG of an advantage to the accused, is an
accessory after the fact.

Under English criminal law, one

v/ho destroys or suppresses evidence of a crime or manufac

tures evidonco tending to ;^rOTre the felon's innocence,
is like?;ise an accessorg?- after the fact,

(14 Amer, Juris,

Criminal Law, Para. lOo, 104.)
Applying these principle a to international criminal
V

law, we hold that one, who is under duty to speak tho

truth, and who conceals the fact that a crime has been

committed, or destroys or supprossos evidence regarding

it, or who manufactures evidonco tending ro prove his
government's innocence, is an accessory within the moaning

of gention 2, Article II, of Control Council Law Uo. 10,
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It must be apparent to everyone that the many
cliversej elaborate and complex J?azi programs of aggres
sion and exploitation '.vere not self-executing, but their

success v;as dependent, in a large measure, upon the devo

tion and skill of men holding positions of authority in
the various departmcnta of the Keich government charged
\7ith the a dministration or oxocution of such programs.
In discussing v/hethcr or not the Koich Cabinet

was a criminal organisation v/ithin the meaning of the

London Charter, the International liixitary Tribijinsl
said I

"The Tribunal is of the opinion that no
declaration of criminality should bo trede
v/ith respect to tb.o .Roich Cabinet for two
reasons;

"(1)

Because it is not shown that

after 1937 it over really acted as a group
or organization;

"(2)

Because the group of persons

here charged is so small that members could
bo conveniently tried in proper cases v/ithout
resort to a

declaration that the CEbinot of

which they wore members v-as criminal .

.

.

"it v/ill bo remembered that Y/hen Hitler
disclosed his aims of criminal aggression
at the Hossbaoh Conference, the disclosure '
v/as not made before the Cabinet, and that

the

Cabinet was not consulted '-ith regard to it,
but, on the contrary, it was made secretly to

a small group upon whom Hitler would necessarily
rely in carrying on the 'ar .

.

.

"it does appear, however, that various
lav;s authorizing acts which "•ore criminal under
the Charter v/ero circulated among the members
of the

Reich Cabinet and issued under its

authority, signed by the members v.^hose department3"v7ere concernod." .
(Vol. 1, HIT, pp 275-276)

—

-rV.

v.'v

f-.

The principles there stpted ere equally eppllcpble
to the defendp'nts here who -were member? of the Cabinet
end to those defendants who occupied popitions of respcn-

sibility end power in the vprious ministries,
concur in end shell ooply the following principles

laid down by the Internationpl Nilitery Tribunal:
"A plen in the execution of which a

number of persons participate is still a plan,

even though conceived by only one cf them;
and those who execute the plan do not avoid

responsibility by showing that they acted
under the direction of the man who conceived

it.

Hitler could not make aggressive war by

himself.

t

i

Re had to h=^ve the cooperation of

statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and
businessmen, ''hen they, vfith knowledge of

his aims, gave him their cooperation, they

made themselves parties to the pl-'^n he h^d
initiated. They are not to be deemed inno
cent becf^use Hitler m^^de use of them, if they
knev; V'/hat they vore doing. That they were
asaigned to their tasks by « dictator does
not absolve them from res'^onsibility for
their acts.
The relation of leader and

follower does not "nreclude responsibility
here any more than it d^-ea in the comparable

J

tyranny of organized domestic crime,"

(Vol I, BT, p ?26.)
i

v-fhile we hold that knowledge that Hitler's wars and

I

invasions were aggressive is an essential element of guilt
under C'^unt One of the Indictment, a very different situa
tion arises viith resoeot to Counts Three, Five, Six, and

Seven, vihich deal ^"Ith w.px- crimes and crimes agoinpt humanity.
Ke who knowingly joined or implemented, aided or abetted

in their commission ac. npincipal or accessory, cannot be

heard to say that he did not know the acts in question

\

were criminal. Measures which result in murder, illtreatment, enslavem.ent and other inhumane acts oerpetrated

-

U

'

on pri'^onerP of vjpt, deport^^^tion, eyterminption, en?lpve-

ment, end nersecution on political, reciel end religious
grounds, end plunder ®nd spolietion of -nublic end privete
property, ere acts v-hich shook the conscience of every
decent man.

These «re criminal per se.

We heve considered the cl'='ims mede by certain of

the defendants that they carried on certain activities
because of coercion and

were forced

duress.,

and that therefore they

to act as they did, ^^nd could not resign or

otherwise avoid compliance with the criminal program.
It may be true that they could not have continued to
hold

office if they did not

so comply,

or that offers

of resign^'tion v;ere not accerted , but j=s the defendant

admits, there were other w^ys av^il^ble

to them by which they could have been relieved from

continuing in their course.

I'^one of their superiors

v.?ould have continued them in office had it constantly

appeared that they disa-nproved of or objected to the
commission of these criminal programs, and therefore

displayed ^ lack of cooperation.

The fact is, that for

varying reasons, each said, as little aa he could, and
when he e^^pressed dissent, did so in words which were
OF soft and Innocuous as he could find,
We find

that none of the defendants acted under

coercion or duress.

-
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WSI73AECKER

The dofendant ERKST VON VJEIZSAEGKER entered the

Foreign Office In 1920 o.nd after serving in various
^capacities there and abroad was appointed Ministerial

Director of the Political Division in 1937, and State
Secret..j?y in April 1938j serving in that cape.city until
the spring of 1943, v/hen he was appointed German Ambassador
to the Vatican^

As State Secretary he was second only to the Foreign

1
r

r

1

Minisoer, Hiobt^ntrop. All divisions of the Foreign Office
wcro subordinate to him. His relations to Hihbcntrop were
never close, and gradually detorioratod. Through him and

his offiop all the activities of the Foreign Office woro_
channeled, cand all divisions wore found to rocort to him,
and in theory and generally in practice received instruc

tions from him. As his relations with Ribbentrop cooled',
occasions arose
^
: when the latter gave
to - , ai rnr.-h
cct; Instructions

to ministers and ambacsadors abroad,
1

i v.

^ s o m e instances

to divisions of the Foreign Office

1 '
^ ^iiicc, without,first consulting
or informing him,
but generally
that was not the case. "

Although the .icfondant IffilZSAECER was not present

at the conforoAcos whore Hitler announced his plans of
I

aggression, he became familiar with them from reliable
sour^cos. i.e., Ribbentrop, Cauai^is, loading denor^is of
the -Jchrmacht and others, who furnished him wit,
.
information,
Ho was neither dooolvod nor ml^
the prograjn, although in certain Instances misled
hn

accurate

concerning

boon fully advised of the actually echeduloa
Ho maJios no question about this. That

world and to his chief, the Foreign rml

'

minister, ho Wore the
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facG of a X'Tilling and earnest collabo ator, or at least
a consenting one, in many instances, ho lilicwlse concedes.

The docLiraents v/hich he signed or initialled, the confer

ences which he had with foreign diplomats, the directions
which he gave to his subordinates, and to the G-orman

diplomatic missions abroad^are more than sufficient,
f

unless othervrise explained, not only to warra,nt but to
compel a judgment of guilty.

*

His defense is that, although appo^ing to

1

collaborate, ho was continuoasly engaged in ondoavoring
to sabotage it and Wc>s an active member of the resistance

«.

movement; that he never sympathized with or ap'orovcd of
the Party movement or of tho Hitler pro'^ram
«

'•

y

nfl

ana

that

when it became clear to him tlmat the f m-o-i o.>.
xuxoign policy of

Hitler and Ribbentrop entailed the danger of war and
that when he became informed that Hitlpv^
intended to

use

aggressive wars and invasions as a meanQ
cuia 1-,^
to carry out

his political plans, he became active in

1

plots and plaJins

to remove him from pox-Jer by means of a Putsch t b

engineered and executed by those chiefs of
n-p -i-u
the Army who
held the same convictions as did he.

inat the men thus

involved included, among others, General q 1=

-

,

cij.b aeck and

Haider, Admiral Canaris, Colonel Ostor and oth
he was convinced that the policies of
entailed, as they did in fact, dCcath

h

' -tiitlor and Ribbcntro-o
riio

'

destruction to the German people anci the
r. ,
' and that his loyalty to *both
Fatherland.,

^
aster and

Of tils

to usothoso fflettiods for the salvation of t.
felt dear.

he
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The defense tho.t things nro not vrhnt they seem,
and thr.t one gave lip service but iras secretly engaged

in rendering even this service ineffective; that, in

saying "Yes", one meant

is a defense readily

available to the most guilty, and is not novel, either
here or in other jurisdictions.

Such a defense must be

regarded \;ith suspicion and accepted with caution, and

then only when fully corroborated.

The exceeding caution

observed by the defendant on cross-cxojnination and his

claims of lack, of recollection of events of importance,
which, by no stretch of the imagination could be deemed
routine, his insistence that he be confronted with docu

ments before testifying about such incidents, were not
calculated to create an impression of frankness and candor.

His failure to suggest at his interrogations that ho was a

member of tho resistance movement and thoi-oforo was opposed
to aggrossion and to tho Nazi Hogime when it must have

ooouri-od to him, as it would to any innocent man', that
cuoh a statement particularly if it was oorroboratad',
Hould ha.vo disarmed those who might otherwise bo in Lubt
of his guilt, is difficult to understand.
However, those instances -lono
- "no ao not justify

n

in casting_aside tho dofonso. It must b
G carefully
considered, oven though this oonsidor-ti

US

on DC accompanied

with caution and even suspicion

a m

man is presumed to-

intend the natural consequences of hio

,

,

^

racts, out this presumption foils if i-u.

n.
h .u
u contrary is^ true
lishes
that. tho
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deliberate
<=vidonce estab

V!e recognize th«t> in the Third Reich, conditions
vhich surround individuals in e free end democratic

society, did not exist and that he v-ho clotted against
the dictator could not vaesr his heart ucon his sleeve

nor leave a trfiil "which could be readily followed,

'7e

therefore rroceed to analyze the defendant's claims,
check them against his acts, to evaluate the testimony
offered u-on his behalf, in the hope, thereby, to unravel
the tangled skein and ascertain the truth,

'He reject the claim th^t good intentiona render
innocent that which is otherwise criminal, pn.6 which
asserts that one may with impunity commit-

t>fcrious crimes,

because he hones thereby to prevent others
oiitr. , or thatx. general

benevolence toward individuelg is a cloak or justificstion

for n^rticicPtion in crimes against the unknown many,
"Planning, Preparing, initiatine nr.

' -

• '

.

waging aggressive

war, with its attendant horrors,> suffer-irr,
^J-xering
crime which stands at the pinnacle of

and loss, is s

^iiminaiity.

por it

there is no justification or excuse,

we shall deal with the charges of aggresrlve
invasions and wars in the order set fnrf-K 4

^orth in the Indictment.

Austri'^,

The prosecution relies u*^on

^

following

evidence:

(1)

That^-fSIZSATUC'^R was Chief of
ox the aermen

Delegation to the mired oommiapj^Qj^
appointed or the besis! of
Austrian Agreement of n

''"9 Germantmt

1936.

-
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(2) Thpt the aefendnnt
mpintPlned oontRct
with the Foreign Office, horing thereby to
eliminate differencea of opinion and that
as Chief of the Political

Division, carried the resr-onsibiiity for
coordination of Foreign Offioe diplomatic
activities vjith the general plans of
aggression,

(3) That

on severe! occasions, talked

^ith ".rEIZ.oABCrv.R, his .ubordlnate Altenburg

and von Neurath - that these conferences, in

particular, cloaked a clandestine meeting
between members of the aermen Delegation and

leaders of the ^a,ty in Austria, particularly
Cnptj^in Leonold,

<.)

section receded

letter stating that Seyss-m.uart .ould not
undertake any obligations relative to
Austrian status without the nrevinn

end agreement .ith Hitler and the aerman

contact

Foreign Office.

(5) That

referent

,
t •^•'-^onburff

f"

tne

..n

Which it w«s p<^id:
"The nrim'^rv reoiHr.,-

spitisfRctory result of
pogress shouia be the ni!

between the men emrowered f

carry
on negotiationrand
Of the movement in Ancfliprevent Schuschnigg

'

a

Reic^o

^xponenfo
order

Peich
agalnst the^Sove::„;^^ping
and vice versa."
In Austria
-

50 -

i

°°°Peration

r

%

(6)

That the Foreign Office, from October 1937,
defrayed orx-h^lf of the monthly propagendp.
exT^enae? incurred by l^^ergle, of the
in Auetria.

(7) That •"JEIZ.*^.AFC'' ER yp-p pv?are, in "February 1938,
that large quantities of National Socialist

propaganda material was being ship->ed illegally
into Austria from Germany.

(e)

I'.HIZ'^AECI-a^E knew of von Neur^th's
diplometio aurtific=tion for the invasion of
Austrle Which wes iesued on or ^bout 1? K«rch
1938.

(9) Thet '^reIZSAECI^R wrote a preface to the Foreign
Office Year Book for 1938, in which he stated
thet thPt ye=<r would =lw=ys hove e speciei renk
in German history as the end of i-h^

the reunion

vdth AustriP end thet it was good t

^

to remember

that in nolitics nothing is accomplished by
mere chance.

n

These claims, however, do not estahiic^h

offense is the Planning, nrenaration

-ti guilt,

inie-

The

uitiation of

pggresrive invasions.

That such an inv«c--ir.^

the result of planning, etc., is perfectiv
i-vio
a f
the defendant
Participated in them, he committ

Place

but unless
no

dnder international l^w, and certainly not th

offense

® one here

charged.

In the absence of treaty oblieoti
^ One
courage political movements in another state

mav an

the leadera of auch movementa and give pJ
financial or

-
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as

other Fupport, ^11 for the purpoee of strengthening the

movement, vJhich hes en ^nne-x-ption es itp ultimate purpose
without violating international lav.

it is only when

these things are done with knowledge that they ^re a part

of a scheme to use force and to be followed, if necessary,
by aggressive war or invasion that an offense cognizable
by this Tribunal comes into being.

There is no evidence

that ^.^rKIZSi^ECTTSR, at the time, knew that Hitler intended

to invade ,Austrif^.

think it may be fairly said that

until the latter stages of the incident, Hitler felt that

his objectives could be att^^-ined by means other th^n

invasion by the German armed forces; his own statements

clearly show that if he could not do so he fully

intended to use force.

If, however, this was not known

to T'JEIZ.SAECFEr at the time he acted, he committed no

offense irrespective of how one may view the morality of
the remainder of the program.

This Tribunal has juris

diction over certain specified crimes, and has none over
questions of morality not involved in those offenses.
The evidence does not establish

guilt in connection with the invasion of Austria
The Sudetenland -

Munich.

While

tha

pursued by
r

Hitler and Ribbentrop in the months beforp

^

.

^-nd during the

Munich conference were those of the thrpot-^...

l^ening bully pna

highwayman, they were effective, and Ene-iav,^

Pnd France,

in an ?^ttempt to avoid a general European
» supinely
submitted.

The "s-act was signed and P^pr^v,

Czechoslovakia was

-
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left helpless end therefore eoquiesced in the resultant
annexation of the Sudetenland.

no war,

There

no invasion and

Germany's possession of the Sudetenl^nd was the

result of an international agreement.

That Hitler had

no intention to abide by it and th^^t his assurances to

"England, France and Czechoslovaicia. that this was the end

of his territorial aims were false, there can be no doubt,
This is established by his own words at the conference of

5 November 1937, recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hossbach,
and reiterated at the meeting of 23 November 1939,

gut

vrgizPAFGirEP was not present at either of these conferences
and there is no evidence that he was nresently informed
of the plans ^^nnounced by Hitler at the first of these
meetings.

That he continuously discouraged Hibbentrop's
nenchant for aggressive war, endeavored to dissuade him

from embarking on a campaign which might involve aggressive
wj^r, is shown from the memorandum which he submitted on
21 cTuly 1938 and again on 19 August of that year.

In the first, in answer to Pibbentrop'a boast that
if necessary, Germany would allow a major war with the
Western -Powers to break out and ^^•ould win it, and that
the French could be decisively crushed in a ma jor
Int. engage
ment with Germany, that Germany was e'Quipped
fv, enough
•i. ^ w-i
v-.iph

raw materials and that Goering was directing aircraft
instruction in such a. way that Germany v/as superior t
any enemy, WEIZSAECFER said:

.
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^

th^t to outsiders one must

telK in such e manner as to convince them.

I said that even vihen it was our task to fool
foreign countries, it vas our duty not to fool
ourselves,

I did not believe th®t we should

win this war.

It was a basic truth that one

could.only conquer a country if one either

occupied It or starved it S&t. To want tS do

this with airplanes was a Utopian dream; so
I did not understand how we could win the war,

nor did I believe in our powers of endurance."

In a memorandum of 13 August 1938, Ribbentrop ex
plained to 'ffllZSAECKER that Hitler was firmly resolved to

settle the Czech affair by force of arms and had said that
on account of flying conditiors the middle of October was

the latest possible date, that the other powers would

definitely do nothing about it and, if they did, Germany
would take them on as well and win. v.JsiTSAECirER then
records his views as follov/s:

V
opposed
theory and
observed
that we
shouldthis
havewhole
to await

developments until the English lost interest in

the Czech mnter end would tolerete our eotLn
risk. Eibbentroa wanted to '.-ut thrquestiof ol

before vre could tackle the affair without undna
responsibility in such a way that T was

responsible to him, he only to the Fuehrer and

the Fuehrer alone to the German nation, whereas
I maintained that one's way of thlnnh ™nereas
be based on such an ideology in order to f
it out to the best adv^nt^ge
PihKa +•
that the Fuehrer had not yit'been w^o ®

that his most difficult dLis^^^^ anrf^t'''^

behalf of the Ehineland were aireaa^ hati

and one must believe in his genius L h«
If I had not yet come to the noln? o?

Ribbentrop, did, from long years of avnoi-

faith in this matter ... hrurSed r.2
to do so.

He said X would certain!v

P'''?

it later, if I did not do so! and 1? thfs®!.,

were later to speak against me."

At the end of August 1938, VraiZ^'AHCFSi prepared a
"strictly secret" report in which he said:
"The next few weeks win

the Czeohoslovaklan question from a ? growth of
• into a Suronean one. The great
crisis
great f,,..
European powers
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will then show their Plignment more cleprly in
militpry snheres,
tooon there v?on't be «^ny more room
for doubt th»t

^nn?rt.
Czechoslov^kiP,
v;ould be fpced with the ot
''•'^estern
"^owers ps Germany
the leading
light, of German policy have pifcu«tion,
got to review
their

plans quickly.

If they should fail to do so. a

European war would develOD after a short warmina-

t

wou?d^^o'^ following upon the German. Such a war
SS
?f
"• GermancancapitulaBi
Theonaiition
of western Fov;ers
if

^

on 1 Sentember 1938 Kordt, in London, reported to

cneyso desire, decide the war without a ireat
blockading Germany.
" defeat would mean for
.Aooir Hitler's reconstruction progrem."

^^^JEIZSAEC^rEP:

t.

"In the course of yesterdey thr •RrTt-iQH

Government received information occordin^^J^

which the Fuehrer intends to solve the rf^=.nS
questions by force. These items of inrnr^ol-*

ohiefly^originate
from Churchill,^-nsUtPr^^''
In yesterday's tplk with

^nd. Christie.

for timely end energetic pction the
on necessity
the nart of
the British Government if they still wanted ?n
prevent the outbresk of

wer

^ "In the Foreign Office all non-German

visitors are given to understand quite onenlv
that Britain would not yield pgpin thio
PS the other time in the case of it^iv'

*

oolicy of the year 1935 had nreduced the mo^f

sevep consequences °nd Britain had to'maWo
UT) Its mind to confront the Germans wMth

categorical 'stop' in conjunction vith ^ht

allies, if need be by force of arms "

On 16 September 1938, von Hassel made i-h^ ^ .

•^ne following

entry in his diary:

"Friday, September the Sixteenth;'

"... TfEIZSAHCKFR told me today that

apparently Chamberlain did not make it
sufficiently clear that England would en
war if Germany used force."
"7e select these documents out of mpnrr v

teoRuse they

are contemnorpneous with the events undar

^

examination.

-
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•von H^psel was p member of the resistance group end was

executed by the F^zi regime in connection with the 20 0"uly

-1944'plot.

The genuineness of his diary is not questioned.

This, with'V?ilIZS^ECF^R'S own testimony, demonstrates .

not only that he was not engaged in planning or preparing
an aggressive war, but th^t he was averse to it and that

he expressed no thought th'^'t, in the long run, it would'
i

be successful but, on the contrary, that it would involve
disaster to Germany,

^

"^e pass now from the views which he expressed to his

t

friend and collaborator, von Hassel and to his chief,
Bibbentrop, to the efforts allegedly put forth to advise

the French f^nd English of Hitler's plans and the suggestions
y;hich he made for their frustration,

/igainst we do not rely

UT^on what his associates now say he thought and did, but
upon what officials^ of foreign governments depose were his
views and acts,

• lord Halifax, who was British Foreign secretary

^

from 1938 to 1940, deposed that although he never had any
official contact with the defendant, he was frequently
reported, by
edviPors f-nd the British hmbessedor
St B,erlin, es being e convinced op-^onent of Nr,zi iaenis
and policy, ^nd he used his official position in the

Foreign Office to hinder, as far as lay

^

execution of Ribbentrop's policies,

lord Halifax gave his second affidavit in which
he denoses that Theodore Fordt's letter of 29

-^nd hlp reply of 9 August 1947 stpte the facts

-
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These

letters on their fece relete to the de-Nezificption pro
ceeding!^ of BriohFordt, v'ho wp.s e witness before this
Tribunel.

Theo Fordt i^vrote:

•TTou will remember that the information I
gpve you pnd sir Pobert Vansittert on Hitler's
plans and moves in these terrible years of

crisis came all from my brother Brich, who

held a key position in the op""osition group.
T'^y brother hanpened to be at

Foreign Office in Berlin.

that time in the

His loyalty did not

belong to this Fazi regime but to the German
people and to the idea of European peace and

international decency,

l/ray i recall that I

informed you on September 5th^l938 of the

impending attack on Czechoslovakia.

In 1938

and 1939 I was in close (sometimes daily)
contact with the Chief Diplomatic i\dvisor to

H.F, Government, Sir Robert Vansittart.

brother c^me several times personally to

My

"London, notwithstanding the obvious risks

for his safety, in order to inform Sir Robert
personally of the impending danger on the
international horizon. Sir Robert assured

me that he would pass this information to you
at once, e.g., of Hitler's plans to come to
an agreement with the Soviet Union, the
negotiations between Hitler and Mussolini

for an alliance and the advice from the German

opposition to put pressure on Mussolini in
order to refrain his partner from the pursunnn^

of his bellicose policy."

Lord

^

u^nce

reply oonta.lne the following statements:
"Of course I remember very well the

information that came to me through Lord

Yansittart in these days before the war

and

that he said reached him from your brother

You will no doubt have been in coramunicatior
with Lord Yansittart direct..

"I cannot doubt that in so acting vonr.

brother took very great risks and in so dnfr
gave very practical evidence of his active

opposition to the criminal policy of Hitler "

The Bishop of Chichester deposes as follows*
"Information came to us in the Uhited
Fingdom that the State Secretary yok

FEIZSAEOT'^ was opposed to Hitler and PIkk
and the Nazi policies and was using his

-
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offioipl position to avoid war.

AS this informa

tion iwent to our Secretary of Stfete for Foreign
.Affairs, Lord Felifax, it was certainly known *
to the Undersecretary of State, Sir Hobert

Vensittert.

Active stecs were taken by, not

only the brothers rordt, but by the state
Secretary, VOU "rSIZSAFCrUE, contrary to Hitler^s

and Bibbcntrop's policies.

Thus through Bishop

Berggrav of O^lo a proposal for neace was sent

to Germany, with the khoi^ledge of the British
Foreign Office. Church representatives In
Germany refused even to accent this proposal.

Bishop Berggrav then took it to VON 'IfUSSAECICFR,

who not only accepted it for use as a possible
means of peace talks, but also encouraged our
efforts, all at great risk to himself. These
facts were reported to the Foreign office of
the United Kingdom. Further,, VON V/FIZSAEGKFR

also cooperated with Bishop Berggrav in
endeavoring to have a representative of Great

Britain m.eet with a representative of Germany
to initiate peace talks.

These facts were also

reported to the Foreign Office of the United

Kingdom,

They demonstrate opposition by VON

'•."EIZS-AECKER

to the policies of Hitler and

Hibbentrop and, with other information comine
to us in England, show he was not *the ^hief
executant of Eibbentrop*s policy* as Lord

Vansittart states,...,

. In conclusion, my information from
private and official sources is that VON
v.TlIZSAECKER was opposed to Hitler and Ribbentron
was genuinely opposed to war, did all he could
to prevent war, and used his office for this
purpose and to bring about peace once' ho«tnifi^.c,

commenced.

I have a special interest in'the

German o^poPltion to Hitler, hRving been oloPelv

conneoted
the op-onentP to Hitler vho were
onwerae, "nfi in nprticuler I was visited htf
representative of the opposition (^astor pLe • v,
Bonhoeffer) who cnme over from RerT-in ? Dietrich

ective in the Germen church conflict from
in the summer of 1942 when I

-^n §4-

on that occasion -astor Bonhoeffer broS"^'^^

secret information about the plot
Hitler, for oo.mmunication to the

ment, and told me the names of nanv of
leaders including Goerdeier and Becktold me of members of the op-'ositinn% ^

Foreign Office.

?

I Passed this informaMnn

in personal interviews with Fr

Anthr^,n

-2

and Ambassador V/inant of the uAited States!"

•
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The prosecution did not demand e Production of

»ny of these witnesses for cross-rexaminstion, nor did
it file interrogatories to be used in lieu of their
personal a-ppearanoe before the Tribunal.

The affiants

are rcen of unquestioned probity, who were in a position
to know the efforts made by the foreign Office opoosi-

^

tion to block and frustrate the plans of Hitler and Pibbentrop for aggressive war.

There can be no question

whatever that both the Kordts were confidants and mes-

^

sengers of von vrRIS^AECFER.
There arc other affidavits, frotc men prominent

*

in the Britsh and American diplomatic service, which
likewise tend to corroborate the testimony of both
Erich and Theo Fordt,

''>re ACQUIT the defendant '•'ffiI2^AEGI'EI?

under Count

One with respect to the Sudetenland.

Bohemia and Moravia:

"^he invasion and forcible incor

poration of Bohemia and T/oravia as a ""Protectorate into

the "Greater German Belch", and the intrigues by which

Slovakia was induced fTd compelled to declare its inde

pendence were not originated by the defendant ""^/EIZBAECFER,
Nor do we believe that he looked upon the project with
favor.

However, this attitude does not constitute a

defense if, notwithstanding his inner disapproval, he
became a party, or aided or abetted or took a consenting
Part therein.

small way.

He was connected with it, and thir

Most, if not all, the conversations he had
„

. . r

.i-'rs

-

1 • • •

_

..

.
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— ^

with the French, BritlFh end It^-lisn diplomet? "were
conducted by YJEIZSABCICSR in PCOord?nce with the custom
" . : of the Foreign Office-

We shall advert to them

hereinafter, but before disoussing them, we shall con
sider the evidence offered by the defense.
The defendant testifies that he was op:osed to
the invasion and in an attempt to prevent it, he directed

Hencke of the German Legation in ^rague to prepare a

report which yfould demonstrate the willingness of the
Czech government to comply with the German wishes and to
adjust the -nolicy and legislation to German demands.
This Fencke confirms, "^nd on £8 December 1958 rendered
a

report,

Fov-ever, it i^ a janus'faced affair,

yVhile on the

one hand it delineates the attitude of the Czech govern

ment as being cooperative, on the other, it erpresses
distrust of some of its members and states that among
the intelligentsia and many officials there existed a
I

feeling that the then state of affairs wes but transitory
and tbey hoped for days of revenge^ that it was not

nosaible to judge whether the majority were for or against
falling into line with Germany; that the preceding few
weeks had led to a stiffening of the general attitude,

p-g ptates that the former Allies of Czechoslovakia, France
and "Russia, had been uninteresting so far as foreign
nolicy •'/^as concerned, and that during the deoirlve crisis
in the nation, the French ?^hov^ed that they w/ere not in any

-
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position to help Czechoslovakia; that relations with
England vJere cool and that although, according to the

orinion of the governrrent, Britain would never help
nor harm their country, they did not wish to sever
relations with her comnletely.

Hencke further sooke

of the "recent improvement" of relations between the

Czechs and Slovakia due to the visit of Hacha to Slo

vakia, and that the Slovskian Ministei» President, Tiso,
had once again spoken of strengthening the bonds of

"blood brotherhood", which had become very weak, and that

the Slovakian copulation gave a remarkably favorable recep
tion to Hacha during his viFit; that in Czechoslovakia the

enactment of the snti-Jewish and other legislation, follow^

ing the German pattern, had aroused'hostile feelings against
Bran who had proposed and had them enacted.

Pe do not consider that this report in any way tended
to help the situation or that it would do other than en

courage any designs wihich Hitler may have had against the
crippled Czech state.

One does not cnlm a dictator who

desires to cru^h a weaker state by pointing out the weak

nesses of a well-intentioned government; the hostile feel
ings of the poT-ulation toward the adoption of anti-semitic

and other legislation fathered by their powerful neighbor*

or their coolness toward the only powers who could possibly
come to their assistance; or by calling attention to the
fact that the tension between an autonomous part of that
state and the remainder was lessening. Bach conditiors
would be factors impelling the dictator to do what he
actually did, namely, to invade and take over.

-
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We may state in passing that it is hot at all

unlikely that this report of the aoproaching entente
between the Czechs and the Slovaks may well have been

one of the reasons that brought about KSFPLEP*S mission
to Tiso in March

1939.

The second step which the defen

dant claims to have taken "was in February 1938, about
four weeks nrior to the invasion, in requesting von ICessel,

who was about to go to .Switzerland, to endeavor to per
suade the British to send a leading figure on a special
mission to Berlin VJho could show Hitler the power of the

British nation, and thereby could make an impression on
him.

Yon Kessel testified that he contacted a Jewish

banker, Erwin Schoeller, who had political connections

in England, and urged him to talk to the British,

why,

in view of hie cloFe relations with the British Ambassador,

and his other connections in London, the roundabout approach
through a Jewish Austrian banker, should have been adopted
in^^tead of a direct anproach such as he had theretofore used,
is not

explained.

The third thing which "rEIZSAECFER asserts that he
did to avoid coming events, wa's to make a significant

gesture to Attollco, the Italian Ambass^ador, when the
letter made an inquiry as to the Czech situation,

Compsred with the measures which "^IZBASctshh took

orior to Munich, these sters were, to say the least,
anemic. The defendant's statements that he did not know
of Hitler's intentions until 10 March 1939, we do not
believe to be accurate. The fact that four weeks before

he gave von Fessel the mis'^ion hereinbefore referred to
-
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"

and the convereationp •'^hich
Henderson and

he had viith Coulondre,

the Czech Minister long before that date

are inconsistent with his

testimony.

Me now turn to what he did and said during the
months before the invasion.
On 10 November 1938, •'•rEIZSASCFH^

dictated a memo

randum, vJhich went to MOSPM^TSTS"'', PITTER, Altenburg, and

von Piohthofen, that he received the Czech, Htoupal, end
on the latter*.s inquiry, told him that the German policy
towards Czechoslovakia was one of good-neighbor relation
ships, insofar as Czechoslovakiaintentions for close

cooperation with Germany were realized^ but that there-

was still something missing in government circles, such
as the long-drawn-out course of economic negotiations;
that he told Stoupal brutally that his government had made

a bad mistake end must react positively to the solutions
Propof^ed by Germany, and make arrangements for the treat

ment of employee contracts in order to oppose dismissals

of nationals or racial Germans, and that when Stoupal

proposed a bl-natlonal commission to handle such incidents

he replied that there should be no incidents and such com

missions were out of place. He further stated that Ptoupal
did not eypress the wl^h to work together with any agencies
of the WDAV,

The defendant received from Pibbentrop minutes of
the iatter*s meeting of 11 October 1938 with Hitler in
which
was directed to notify the Polish Ambas
sador that Germany was not interested in Oderberg but

-
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in MoravB-Ostrava, and Witkowitz; that vJhether MoravaOatrav^ snd Witkowitz remained a part of Czechoslovakia

depended on farther developments; that vith regard to

Bratislava, the Hungarians •were to be told that Germany

was, on principle, sympathetic toward the Hungarian demands,
with respect td Czechoslovakia, but Germany would resort to
«rms only if German interests were at stake»

For his per

sonal information, VJEIZSAECFFR was informed that if Hungary

would mobilize, it would not be Germany's intention to
i

restrain her or advise moderation.

It is to be remembered that this took place within
two weeks after the Munich Agreement.

On 22 December 1938 Coulondre, French Ambassador to

Berlin, reported to the French Foreign Minister his con
ference with ^^'TEIZSAECKER as follows;-

"^-ath regard to the international guarantee
envisaged in favor of Czechoslovakia, Baron VON

^'•.'EI^^'AECFER was reticent. ^Vhen I reminded him that
in -^aris Herr von Ribbentrop had expressed his in
tention of reexamining the question, and asked
-whether there were any new developments, he answered
in the negative. •Could not this matter • he aaWafl

with a smile, 'be forgotten?' Since Gerianyts nL- '
dominance in that area, is a faot, would nnf
guarantee of the Reich be sufficient?' t

4-

fail to remark that obligations entered in?^
4be forgotten, and placed the matter in if? 2 oeiHiot
light. But I received the impression f???

interlocutor had already made urMs mind!
"'Besides,' he concluded, 'it "wnin;? u

Czechoslovakia to claim that guarantee

case, we are in no hurry to settle thil «

and M. Ohva.lkovsky is not coming to
after the holidays..'- Actually the vio +f
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister has p i 2

postponed twice."

i^-eaay been

®

on 28 December 1936, WEIZSAECFER reported to Ribben
trop, with copy to WOERR^ATO, that he had

^"iKea with Magis^

trati, the Italian charge d'affaires; that the latte h. d
-
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igflin braoohed the subject of the guaranty for the
integrity of Czechorlovakia, saying that he was directed

by Count Ciano to state that the Italians wished to pro
ceed in accord with the Germans,

\VEI2SASCKEE states that

he avoided going deeper into the subject, and told him
that he had just recently explained to the French Ambas

sador, without any restraint, that Czechoslovakia depended
exclusively on Germany, end that the guaranty of any other

power was of no use; that the Czechoslovakia "of today"
v;as different from that of the time when the guaranty was
under di^^cussion, and that he had already so informed
Attolico.

On 8 February 1939 the British government stated

that it thought that the time had arrived to settle the

question of a guarantee of Czechoslovakia in accordance
with the appendix of the Munich "^aot and in view of the
statements made by the Italians in January, the British
desired the German opinion on the matter,

WFIZSAECKFR crenered the answer to this, namely,
that Germany did not think that the entry of England and

France into such an obligatory guarantee would offer any
security against the beginning or the aggravation of such

diarutes or conflicts vjhlch might arise as a result of it;
that from past experience, the Belch feared that declara
tions of guarantee on the part of the ''Vestern Powers in
favor of Czechoslovakia, would rather inteuv^ify the dis
pute between Germany and the surrounding states; that the

•
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attitude of the Czechosloveklan government lay in the

fact that in the paet years the various Czech govern

ments, as a result of the military guarantees given

them by ^'restern'"^owers, more or less seriously meant,
believed that they could simply by-rass the inevitable
demands of the ethnic minorities,

and that the German

government was aware that, in the last analysis, the
final development in this Euronean area would come first

and foremost v^ithin the adhere of the most vital interest
of

the German Reich.

On 22 February 1929 the Czechoslnvf^klan charge
d'affaires made an urgent request to confer with

SAECKER and during the interview gave him a note in which
the question of the guarantee of the rest of Czechoslovakia

was raised, and connected with it a solemn pledge of neu-

tr=^lity and non-intervention on the part of that country
and asked to be informed as soon as possible of the German

point of view, and stated th^'t like notes were about to be

delivered to Rome, ^aris and London, v^eizsaecfer reports
that he answered the Czech statement saying that whether

the sten taken in Berlin was one half or an hour earlier
or l=^ter did not seem to him to be relevant, Pind that it
struck him that the Czech government applied

•
siniultaneously
to all the four Munich "^owers in such questions
^
^
, Without

first entering into discussions with Germany alone
On 3 March 1929 Mastny, the Czech Mini
4- Berlin,
^
i -i-iij... Ler to

called on W^XZSASCICEP regarding the same matter end

-
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V.r5IZ*^A"PICKErR called hi(B attention to the answer already
given to the French and British.

Mestny stated that the

guarantee would bring to an end the present state of un
certainty and give the "^rague government a better chance

to deal with these elements who disliked oooperatior. with
Germs-ny, and finally endeavored to persuade

to see Masoryk, but VJFIZS_AFCI''EH turned this suggestion
aside.

On 15 Farch the French Ambassador called on

GAFCI^R; stating that Germ-^ny's march into Bohemia on

the 14th gave reason to infer serious concern as to Ger
many's attitude towards the rest of Europe, Pnd demanded

information oi. these proceedings from German official

quarters, stating that the entry into Czechoslovakia by
German troops was in violation of the Munich Agreement

''^IZ'^AFCKER reported that he treated Coulondre in a rather
harsh manner, telling him that he should not talk about

the Munich Agreement being allegedly violated by Germany
and Should "abstain from giving us any lessons"; that the

Munich Agreement contained two elements, namely, the pfe

servation of peace and the French disinterest in Eastern
questions, and France should turn her eye towards the
West and ston talking about things where its nRT•t-^«^
• ^-"-Qipation,

as Germany knew from experience, did not nromota

the French Ambassador had realized that Germanv
•y

peace;

that

^

wuuiQ have

been forced to establish order in CzechoslovaW-i
q on her
-^'-'vrtR.xa
own initiative, if the Czechoslovakian State
resident

had not desired to cell on Hitler and made tho •«
journey to

-
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iT.

•v.-'-fi
•< ^1

Berlin, and that France should realize that this was
not only a necessary actionf* but also one agreed upon
with the Czech government.

All of these statements made to the French were,
as "•^IZSAECF'T? then well knew, wholly false.

On 17 March 1939 V/EIZSAECFFR reported that the

Brit ish Press, which had stated that the German Foreign
Office had given both France and England assurances that

Germany would take no drastic steps at the very moment

when German troops had already crossed the Czech border

was wholly in error; that the French Ambassador had not

inquired on the e«y in question, but r°.ther, on ^Vednesdsy,
«na the Pritish Ambessador hsd been told five hours before
the Germsn troops msrohed over the border; thPt the British

Ambassador had been told otherwise and that Germany would
attempt to realize its demands in a decent manner, and
the invasion would take plaoe in a like manner.

on 18 Faroh 1939 the French Ambassador attempted to

deliyer a note protesting against German action, ^ffilZSAECKER
refused to accent the note and advised Ooulondre to Persuade
his government to revise their opinions. When

.

^#nen the Ambesspdor

wished to go into the matter describing it as ^ violation
/

of the mnichPaot, •>JllZSASOFFB stated that from the\eg!i
point of view there had been astatement agreed to betw!In
the Fuehrer and Hacha, and that the OBeoh Fresident had
come to Berlin at his own wish and had immediately and

in advance declared to the Foreign Minister of the Rei h
hat he wished to plaqe the fate of his country in tne
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hpndr of the Fuehrer; that he, '-TEIZSAFGFET? did notthink thpt the French "were holier th^n the Pope end

'^iehed to interfere in mpttere "^Phich hed been agreed

upon in an orderly faj^hion between Fr^^gue and Berlin.
^'v'EIZSAECKFH admit? that

not true.

these statements "were

We find it difficult to reconcile

the defen-

dant*s present protevStations with the actions "which we

have just related,'

There is nothing to indicate that

when Hitler's aggressive plans became imminent, as they
had been for several months, he took any measure? to

encourage the British, French or Italians to take sny
action to prevent Hitler from acting.

His attitude was

radically different from what it had been prior to Munich.
The reason for th^t, we think, is obvious:

Before Munich

he feared that France and England "^would take up arms in

defense of Czechoslovakia, and that if they did so, Germany
would suffer defeat, After Munich, he felt that this danger
to Germany had vanished, and he looked with complacence,
if not sp'^roval, on the future fate of Czechoslovakia,

$

He was not a mere by-stander, but acted affirmatively
and himself conducted the diplomatic negotiations both with
the victim and the interested powers, doing this with full

f

knowledge of the facts. Silent disapproval is not a defense
to action. Mhile we appreciate the fact that M;IZ.SAECKSR
did not originate this invasion, and that his part was not
a controlling one, we find th^^t it was real and a neces=:a r
implementation of the program,

We are therefore compelled to hold him G"aTTmv
j-L.ix

under

Count One with resnect to the invasion of Czechoslovakia
-
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y

Pol?nd;

vjeizSAECT-T^Rattitude with respect to Poland and

the aggression against th'^'t state presents a difficult
problem.

The proaecution exhibits on this phase seem to

indicate not only a anirit of intransigence but an attempt
to induce the French and British to abandon or at least

modify their Poli.^h Treaty to defend that country ag^inpt
Hitler's aggression.

The claim that this Treaty gave
/

Poland a "blank check" is without merit.

Neither the

British nor the French so regarded it, and their repre
sentatives repeatedly so ad.vi^ed both the Polish and
%

German Foreign Office. Its purpose was to make starkly
clear to Hitler that the time for appeasement had g-ne by
nne thi? hip oft-given egsurpnoes of p fleslre for pepce end
en Pbsence of further territoriel elms v^ere regarded es
being, whPt they POtuslly vere, wholly voorthless. The
defence puggeFtr thflt this Treaty of -roteotion wes

diplomptic error, nsrticulerly because the French snd
British oomitments were mede publicly, which tended, to
enr«ge Hitler end goed him to further ection,- .Such en

assumption, however, is based upon a speculation so tenuous
that it is not worthy of oonsideretion.

The methods of confidential approach and oral repre
sentations had been already tried and found futila

.-w-oxitj.

t.-

Hitler

was immune to them. There was but one remedy left namely
nleinly and publicly to inform Germany that the neyt
attem^^t at aggression meant war,

of conroe.

^ 4.
enraged

Hitler, but it made him hesitate even though it had

-
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effect upon his plans or his intentions.

He did not

(iare make the attack in the face of the British and French
guarantees to ^oland until he had secured his eastern

boundaries from possible attack by Russia,

This he did

by means of the German-Soviet Treaty of 23 August 1939.

There he not only protected himself, but, apparently, by
giving the Soviets a free hand in the Baltic states and in

Bessarabia and by agreeing to share the loot in Poland, he

gained a partner.

A? long as the Polish State existed, it

is sheer nonsense to talk about Hitler's fear that the

Soviets might attack, ••.'hatever may have been the attitude
of "^oland toward Germany, there can be no question that had
the Russians attacked thej?eich, ^oland and the Baltic

states for their own preservation would have been thrown

to the side of Germany, and the suspicion which ^oland felt
toward Russia would have made a "^olish-Russian alliance

wholly unlikely.

If a Russian offensive took place in the

north it could only go through ^oland, and if it took place

in the south, Hungary and Rumania were bound to stand along
side the German forces.

It is quite obvious that neither

France nor England, who, in the fond hope of maintaining
"^eace, had failed to come to the aid of Austria and

Czechoslovakia, would h«ve joined in or even promoted

Russian aggression. The fact is clear that Hitler at no
time had any intention to abandon his plan to destroy

"^oland, th»t he only awaited a favorable opportunity ^nd
only fear would have prevented him from carrying out his
pl»ns.

-
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"'hile giving full credit to the "^olep end their

magnificent battle to maintain their freedom and mthout

overlooking the desperate hazard of their position, far
separated as they were from their allies, the fact remains
that, at times, they did not realize the necessity of
dirplaying caution and control in handling the situation
and that their somewhat explosive attitude toward Hitler

and the Nazi ^arty, who were bent on making incidents to

justify an aggression, did not help the situation.

That

these mistakes irritated one who was trying to preserve

^eace is understandable, and that he should have expressed
this irritation in talking with the French and British

Ambassadors may well explain his desire that pressure be

exerted upon'the-^oles to refrain from furnishing an excuse
which could be seized by Hitler.

^^JEIZSAHCFER had no part in the plan for l^olish

aggression, he was not in the confidence of either Hitler
or Hibbentrop.

While his position was one of prominence

and he was one of the principal cogs in the machinery which
dealt with foreign policy, nevertheless, as a. rule, he
wias an implementor and not an originator. He could oppose
and object, but he could not override. Therefore, we seek

to ascertain what he dia and whether he did pii that i^y
in his power to frustrate a policy which outwardly he

apr^eared to support. If in fact he so acted, we are not
interested in his formal, official declarations, instruc
tions or lnterviev?s with foreign diplomats,

in this

respect we proceed with caution and reserve before
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^ccer^ting hir defence that v^hile apparently acting
affirmatively he was in fact acting negatively.

In June 1935 a

♦•visit"

of a German Naval S'qaadron

to the Port of Danzig was nroposed, andonbtedly to make a
disnlay of force which, if carried out, might well have

lit the flames of war.

"^IZSASCFER fortified himself with

the opinion from Referent Famnenhoeveaer, which called

attention to the fact that, by agreement between Poland

and the Free City of Danzig, requev^-ts from foreign powers
to bring men-of-war into that ^ort were to be presented

first to the Tholes for consideration, and the diplomatic

correspondence would be conducted by th^='t country and not

by the City of Danzig, and that Germany had recognized and

oonstnntly obperved this prsctice. Bssefl on this memorandum,
P'SIZSAECIPfCR delayed the matter and on 19 luly 1939 advised
that while a warlike solution of the Danzig question would
almost always be kept in mind, bl«^me must be put on the

Poles, whereas sending part of the fleet to Danzig would
be internationally interpreted as an overture to the
generally expected German-Polish conflict.

E'^rly in July 1939 ICeitel inquired as to the

political advisability of publicly displaying certain

artillery which the Wehrmacht had smuggled into Danzig
and on 14 July '".^IZSAECI^ instructed von Nostitz to

inform Feitel that while artillery exercises were doubt
lessly necessary, they should be carried on indoors and
it would be advisable to wait -- that the Poles would
oertainly commit a new blunder whic};i could be answered

by a public ap*:^earance of the batteries, ^^otwithstending
-
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certpin phesep in thepe document?, the fact remains

that his advice was that of caution that inflammatory
\

incidents might be avoided, and vjas in opposition to the
Plans of Hitler and the Wehrmacht,

Ti-e German-'Hussian

Treaty had not yet been negotiated,

and that between the

French, British and the Soviets had not as yet failed.

AS early as 16 August 1939, Henderson, the British
Ambassador to Berlin, reports a conversation with

''TIIZSAECFFR.

This is one of the documents upon which

the prosecution strongly relies, as it discloses not only
an acrimonious discussion between the Ai-bassador and the
'^itate Secretary, but also 'ajeizSAEGFEP'S irritation over

the "Polish actior and his attempt to persuade the British '

to at least modify the so-called "blank check" agreement.
To us, however, even more significant is. the fsct that he
plainly warns the British of the danger of war and of

Hitler's attitude, and before the Soviet Pact was signed

(23 August 1939) informed Henderson that he believed that
Pusf=^ian assistance to the :^oles would not only be
entirely negligible, but the tJSSP would even in the

join in sharing the "^olish spoils.

Thus the British

received explicit warning, ^^nd the door was open to the
either to endeavor to block the execution of any pact

between Germany and Pussia, or, if this were impracticable
otherwise to prepare themselves for the event,
evpnf

-r
.je

believe that ore who was in favor of the prospective

aggression against "^oland would reveal the likelihood
imminence of a Germon-Bursian "^act.

-
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d

"7e do not rely upon the affidavitp of the Swiss,
Karl J. Burokhardt, who was then International Commissioner

for Danzig, except insofar as they are corroborated from
other sources, tbis for the reason that the witness did
not appear for cross-examination, either because of his

^

own reluctance or upon instructions from his government,

V'e find it difficult to reconcile a willingness, personal

I

or governmental, to permit an ^

narte statement to be

given and an unwillingness to permit inquiry as to the
accuracy of the statement.

Turning now to the contemporaneous documents of

15 A\iga^t 1939, 'TEIZrj^ECI\ER had discussions with both
Fender-^on and Coulondre, French Ambassador.
official reports.

These are

While the conversations express an

attitude on the part of 7JEIZSAECrER inconsistent with his

present claim that he disagreed with the policies of Hitler
and Ribbentrop, and are critical of Polish policy, and

express the hope that the policy it was pursuing wom(i
lessen the bond between the Western "'^owers and Warsaw

it is also clear that he informed both Ambassadors of the
imminent danger and likelihood of war. Henderson says*
'"•men last I saw him (State Secretary

">m;iZSAFCFER) , he had regarded the position
as less dangerous than last year.; now he
considered it no less dangerous and most
urgent•"

Both Ambassadors clearly warned •'/SIZ^AECICER that if the

Poles were compelled by any act of Germany to resoi.t to
arms to defend themselves, there was not a shadovj of
a

doubt that the Western Powers would give them

-
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'^upnort

T^T---

Coulondre went even further and stated:
"I advised him not to lose himself

in

subtleties; the fact was that if any of the

three Allies, France, England, and Poland,
were attacked, the other two would automatically
be

at her

side."

Long nrior to this, and when Hitler's planvS for
•Polish

aggression again became more clear, ^'/EIZSASCKSR

instructed iCordt in London to discuss the situation with

Lord Halifax and others connected with the British Foreign
Office, and to point out the necessity speedily to pursue

their negotiations with the Soviet Union for a treaty of
mutual a?^sistance against German aggression,

Kordt

received assurances that the-^e negotiations were certain
to be successful.

On 17 August 1939 Coulondre reported to the quai
d'Orsay, and described not only his own views, but the
comments of the Briti-h Ambassador after his discussion
with the defendant.

Coulondre says:

"In this connection I was extremely strnnv

by the fact that, on the same day, the ^tatp

necretary had asked both my British coIIpp^L
and.'myself the same Question, namely

your Government wage war on the sidp

,

thp conflict
cnnfiint had
hpd hppn
if the
been nrovoked bv thPPoland
i

This question might have been a-ked P-i+-H

order of higher authorities and becanpp pS ^
was doubt on the subject, or because tL
State Secretary, onrosed to war

anfl

8t the development of the eitustion

have liked to gein from oar replies'sunnort
for action in higher quarters. i
•;;;;»?•
towards the first hypothesis, but whichevp^!^^^
the alternatives is correct, the question

strikes me as a particularly grave onp

would seem to indicate that Hitler i=;
harboring illusions on the attitude of^v
and England in the event of a Germpn
German conflict, or at least thnt ptt-

are still being made to delude him on
subject,"

-
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the

ViTElZSA'iiCKER Exhibit 1?,0 is it^entifief^ by Ellinore

Greinert as being carbon cooies of memoranf^a written by

WEIZSA-^CKER an(^ given to her for safekeeping in 1939 by Dr.
Viktor Bruns.

';^hey are datea 30 August, 31 August, 5 Septem

ber, and 7 September 1939.

-^he first states that the British

Embassy, which haf" been asked late on the night of the S9th

'

I

of August to undertake the task of having Polsnd son'^ a Pleni
potentiary for negotiations, at Your o'clock in the morning
reported the technical difficulties in bringing the Plenipotentiary to Berlin before the end of 30 August, and at eleven
a.m. pleaded for uiore time, and that the ijxxois-n
B-pitieii Ambassador
a.v,-u
in

* • " the afternoon wrote Ribbentrop to the same effec'-w.

wvt

W^X Z SA iiCXER

relates the mirnisht interview between ^fnaerson ano Ribbentrop,

at which the latter h-^istily read the German proposal and
refused to give Henderson a copy on the basis that i-h
- -'' 11 w a, s

outdated.

The mcmorand'um of 31 .August states that the whol ^
,
had been de-voted to the question whether or nnt «

^

ay

^ connection

„ betw: en Warsaw and Berlin could be established and th. t h

WEIZSAECKER, had suggested that the Polish Ambassador h,
I

be given an audience; that WEIZSAECKEH discusspd

mis matter

with Ribo'Sntrop who disagreed, and that WEIZSAECK^r
" thereupon
offered, to resign and "even more"; that he told Rikv.
that he, A-blZSAECKbR, would be a swine if he did

^iDbentrop
*.

- ^ct tell him

wha1i he thought,
I

As a result, Lipskl was received but sent

away with the

formal excuse that he did not possess any authority i
tiate,
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^

The memorpnclajii of 5 September 1939 Is e. history

of the efforts, beginning as esrly ss April 1933, which
he claims to have made to preserve peace and his hope

th«t the Italians, on £ September, would endeavor to bring
about

^

a

truce,

The memorandum of 7 Septem,ber recites that when
all other attempts to bring a "^olish :^lenipotentiary to

f

Berlin had failed by twelve o'clock on 31 August, the only
remaining hope resided in German military circles, he

/

informed Goering that it was high time he came and asked
him whether they were obliged to allovv an insane advisor

of Hitler to destroy the Reich; he said that Ribbentrop

would be the first one to hang, but others would follow;
that Goering had implored the Fuehrer three times to

give in, but Hitler only shouted at him and sent him away.
He said:

i

"I told Brauchitsch that politics were

at an end.

I said that we were dealing not

only with Poland, but also with England and

France. That was certain. I said to him that
the military, i.e. he, Brauchitsch, would

h«ve to bear the responsibility before history
if we entered into this war,?^nd I asked him
if he wanted to take uPon himself this

responsibility just because Hitler had an

insane advisor.

All that Brauchitsch had to

say was th'^t the Fuehrer did not think that
the English and the French would participate
in this war and that was what Brauchitsch
would bave to go by. When I asked him

whether or not he was reading the newspapers
he only shrugged his shoulders. Thus my l^^st
hope vanished."

These documents, if genuine, are of utmost

significance. We think that they are suspiciously
and no reason appears for writing them unless one was
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attempting to speak to history.

'7e •would

receive them

only with'the greatest caution unless they were corrobo
rated.

To a large extent they are.

First," there ere

the entries in the von Hassel diaries, the genuineness
of which is not questioned,

von Hassel wes in early

pnd continuous opposition to Hitler,

an opposition which

ended only with his execution after the unsuccessful

>-

v-atsch of 20 July 1944.

We quote:

' "August 31, 1939:
^This morning at seven tvjenty-five '.'•JEIZSAECKER

called me
asked me to meet him at eight-forty.
He explained that^he had to de»l with the follow-'

"ing situation:

Since nothing had been hear(j go

far from the "Poles, Bibbentrop had called for"

Henderson last night and had railed at "him

exclaiming that these delaying tactics of the

English and Poles were contemptible. The German
Government had been prepared to make a very
acceptable proposal, which he read to Henderson
Essentially it contained the following points:
Danzig to be ceded to the Reich, but demili
tarized; referendum in the m^in part of the

Corridor, and, depending upon the result, either
a German east-west traffic route or a Polish

south-north route to Gydnia, which would remain
Polish. But these definitely modest terms were
of course no longer open a? no Polish negotiator

had come.

Therefore there was nothing left for

Germany but to take action to secure its rights.
pflfter thie unfriendly interview, which
did not constitute a complete break, Hitler

made it known th=^t the other rids had now put
^ itself clearly in the wrong, pnd that there
fore
attack might- begin thir afternoon,

^'.'EIZPAECICSR considera the rituation extremely

serious; matters stand exactly where they were
on Friday. Fast we really be hurled into the
abyss because of two madmen?
"Of course one can never be sure with

Hitler: it is not entirely out of the question
that he will recoil at the last moment. But
v/e agreed that we could h°rdly expect this to

happen ainoe, after all, Hitler had really
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K.'''

'decided on war Friday and had given orders to that
effect.
Under the circumstances h'EIZSAECKCR could
see only one hope, - that Henderson should
immediately persuade the Polish Ambassador and
his ovn government to urge '".'arsaw this very
morning to send a Plenipotentiary at once, or
at least to have Lipski announce this intention

to Ribbentrop before noon.

Could I

'privately'

influence Henderson to this end, and could I

perhaps also v.'om Goering about the rash decision
of Hitler?
Goering should bo made to understand
that Ribbentrop v-as digging the graves of the
Reich and of Hatlonal Socialism.
Harinhall would

go up in flames.'

I said I was pr'epared to try

my luck.

"liy impression v/as that Ribbentrop and Hitler

are in a spirit of criminal recklessness,- They
are running the most fearful risks, involving the
whole German people, merely tosave their Own

prestige by some minor success, - all this, of
course, being only a temporary stopgap.

'

So far

as I am concerned the one vital thing is to avoid
a

world Y>rsr.

got

"I found Henderson at breakfast; he had
to bed at four o'clock. He was, above all

shocked at Ribbentrop's bad manners,

Ribbentrop

v/as evidently determined to play In this v;ar the

baneful role Berchtold had played in the last one
Henderson said Ribbentrop had read him the German*
proposals very hurriedly (liad gabbled them') had
not given him a copy because they v/ere nov; 'water over
the dam.' The peremptory character of our latest
move was destroying all efforts to keep the peace
I e::plainGd the situation to him and emphasized thq-'I came'entirely as a private person and without
orders, and had only the desire to heir in reachinoa peaceful solution by making clear to^him the
4

stupendous significance of the next fev; hours

"He said that during the night he had been

in touch with London, as v/ell as with Linski 1

that he would continue his efforts,

The"^" chief

difficulty lay in our methods, ^artlcularlv the
way in which v/o expected the English to order tbA
roles around like stupid little boys. i told h*
that th.c persistent silence of the Poles was al

objectionable. This Slavic behavior, with vbLlch^
he doubtlessly had become familior in Petersburg

was dangerous.

He said, nostalgically, he wiahp,?

those times would only come back, - times

I

countered, with a poor attempt at jostin^' in

which he had almost strangled his ambassador r
it seemed to me, he was in a mood to stran®lp

In conclusion, Henderson said it would be
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others.

easy to reach an understanding between England
and Germany if it v/ere not for the calamitous

Ribbentrop.

V/ith him it would never be possible.

"About nine-thirty I vrent to Olga Riegele,'
told her that the situation v;as terribly serious,
and asked her to arrange a meeting between rae and

her brother Hermann (Goering).
woman did so at once.

Tearfully the good

Shevas successful in reach

ing him at his *battle station,' as he later put

it, and I had a long conversation with him.

He

asked at once whether I v/anted to talk with him
about the Italians, I said 'No,* but stated that

I was a friend of Henderson who was doing all he
could to keep the peace, Goering asked why, in

that case, he had been so 'snooty' durinp- the

latest discussions.

I'answered I did not believe

that was his intention, but possibly it v/as
difficult for some people to get along,

"Goering said he liked Henderson but that he
was too slow.

I answered that naturally he-wa« an

Englishman and not a Latin,
very best, Goering said he
was really modest, to which
been described as no longer

but he v/as doin'^ his
thought our proposal
I replied that it had
valid, Goerin-^ there

upon became very animated and asked hov; Henderson"
could have reached this conclusion since the
proposal would become invalid only if no Polish

negotiator arrived;

T answered that this point

v/as most important, that I v'ould tell Henders(ion
at once and urge him to exert himself further in
that direction.

"Goering: 'Yes, but he must come
"I:

nnce. » ... ..i

'That is technically impossiblcj it must
suffice if the Polos declare they will
send one,'

"Goerings

'Yes, 'but he must come very ouickT-rr

Go tell the Foreign Linister immediatel
v/hat you have heard from Henderson, »

"I;

I do not know whether I can do thok v.
any case, I ^/ill tell '•'EIZ3AECKEH. t ^

"Ily impression v/as that Goering reallv
peace, Olga had previously told me, weepW
recently he had put his arms about her and

'

'Now, you see, ever3rbody is for war, onlv T Ju'

soldier, and Field i:arshal, am not. '

"But why, then, docs this man, at th ^

^

sit in Oranienburg? And Brauchitsch and ^ ®
are flying about over the West Wall,'
aloer
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"I went back to Henderson at once and told
him what G-oering had said. He was greatly inter
ested anci_wrote down the most important parts,

"^hen to WiilZSALCKHR, to whom I reported the steps

I

had taken.

"After an hour V/EIZSAHCKER called for me
'again. Henderson had requested the text of our
proposals in order to have something to show to
the Poles. Officially WEIZSAECKER was not per
mitted to give'it to him. Rid I think it possi

ble to give Henderv=ion a more detailed knowledge
of the contents, w>^ich meant perhaps to put the

paper itself into his hands?
before me on the

The document lay

table.

"At that moment a telephone call came from
Ribbentrop, and immedia'^ely thereafter a second
The gist of both was that Henderson should not

be given the proposals. He v^imself would call
and tell him that the Poles had. been plainly
told they would get the proposals if they sent
a plenipotentiary,
agreed that under these
conditions it was now impossible to give ^endersnn
the document or any further details,^.
son
t

"Riboentrop had forbidden WEIZSAECKER to hava
any further dealings with Henderson and had added
that Hitler had ordered all advances be rebuff ^

That was proof for WEIZSAECK^jR that Hitler and^

Ribbentrop wanted war; they imagined their propn
sals had furnished them an alibi. This seems n

sensical to me if the proposals are not given to"*"

the Poles,

"Hib^entrop further stated that during the

next half hour it would'be decided, whether the
proposals should, be mad'e public. If t^is is

under disoussion, It Is altogether InoomprehenfM

why the proposals should not be given tn

unless they want war.

®

^^©rson,

"WEIZSAECKER said Rome was making effnrta imediate in I^nndon. '^'^ussolini is said to h v

declared that a fait nouveau had to be creat^fl
and the best move would be for Poland to ced

Danzig to G-ermany at once.

WEIZSAECKER wao Z

doubtful whether the Poles would do that

for its part, informed the Italians that'the

question now was one of honor; w^^ether we

Lipski to call or whether he was to come of\i

own accord. With this in mind i discussed
WEIZSAECKER whether 1 should go to Henderso
more to induce him to get Lipski out of hi

But we agreed that Henderson knew the situ^fi

would do all he could anyway.

go to see him.
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Perhaoa t

and

shall still

"Afternoon.

I did go to ca.ll on Henderson

and met him in front of the embassy.

I

told him

everything depended on Lipski'g putting in an ,
appearance — not to ask questinns, but to deolpre
his readiness to negotiate — but at once.
He

wanted to support this suggestion immediately,
also told Henderson that Goering had arrived.
Young Kessel had Just seen him drive in,

I

"At the Foreign Office I had met Moltke
(Ambassador in WarsTaw) and arranged to bave lunch
-with him at the Adlon.

Ag I arrived at the hotel

Kessel appeared in great alarm to tell me that

Lipski bad presented himself, but that there was
a. reluctance to receive him.
Since Moltke had.

told me the same thing a few minutes before, I
tried first by telephoning Olga Riegele to influ
ence Hermann Goering, with the request that he

give me a hearing if possible,
however,

I did not succeed

Kessel declared the danger was extremeIv

grave. V/EIZSAKCKHR had to M him the best thine:
would be to persuade Mussolini to telephone Hitler
at

once.

"Could I go to see Attolico?

I was not very

anxious to perform this mission, but in view of
the situation_I said I would, Attolico received

me at once. He swore that once upon a time he had
done everything possible for me I And I promised
absolute silence concerning our conversation. He
• understood instantly what was at issue, and pro
mised to telephone Rome at once,"

We also have the affidavit of the widow of Ambassador

Attolico, which bears out WEIZSAECKER'S statement that he

induced the Italian Ambassador to inform Rome of the impend

ing danger and to persuade Mussolini to intervene. That thig
was done is apparent from the Ciano diaries. These entries
begin with 19 July 19.*^9, as follows:
"July 19, 19?9:

"I sumiuon Magi strati to Rome on the matter
of the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini

which is set for the fourth of August, i fear
that it is due to Attolico's endemic crisis of
fear. Nevertheless, we must prepare the meet
ing weH in order to prevent its being futile
Perhaps,

in view of the fact that for
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many reasons war plans must be delayed as long
as possible, he could talk to the Fuehrer about

launching a proposal for an international peace
conference,..,.

of Hitler?

But v/hat are the real intentions

Attolico is very much concerned and

Y/arns of the imminence of a new and perhaps
fatal crisis.

July 20, 1939:

*

"The information sent by Attolico continues
to be alarming. Prom v;hat ho say;3, the Germans
are preparing to strike at Danzig by the four
teenth of August. And for the first time Caruso
from Prague announces movements of forces on a

^

vast scale.

But is.it possible that all"this

should take place v/ithout our knowing it, indeed,

after so many protestations of peace made by our
Axis comrades?

bb shall see....

"July 21, 1939:

"Ilassimo (Count Tagistrati, Counsellor to the

Italign Embassy in Berlin) is not so pessimistic

about the situation and he confirms my suspicions'
That sAttolico permitted himself to be carried av/av
in a fit of panic v'ithout very good reasons

~

"July 22, 1939:

"I take I.Iagistrati to the Duco, who has
v/orked out a plan of v; el come for the meeting

at Brenner Pass.

It is based on the proposal

of an international conference.

The Duce out

lines at some length the reasons for our pro-"

posal. I am skeptical of the possibilities of
such a conference actually taking place but I
agree on the utility of our move which will
above all, throw confusion'and dissension

the camp of the opposition, ^7here many voic^
are already being heard against war.

"I insist on tv/o points:

(i)

That the

condition must be included that our urnnncoT

be considered valid only if the Germans do not

previously decide to wage war, since, in that

case, it I'oulo be useless bo discuss anvtb-in-irr.

(2) that Ribbentrop is interested irf the
question. I am doubtful, very doubtful ahnnt

Attolico»s ability now. lie has lost his head
I am sending a telegram to Hagistrati ordering

him to take part personally in all the necrotl?
tions....

'•

•

'

negotla.

"July 26, 1939:

"I talked by telephone with Ulapiatrpi-^

about the conversation with Ribbentrop. hL
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reaction to the proposal of an international
conference was unfavorable.

He vriii t a l k

about it to the Fuehrer, but it is now easy
to see that nothing; will come of it.
In
which case, it v/ould seem to be a good idea
to postpone the meeting of the two chiefs.
In any event, before suggesting a decision to
the Duce, I prefer to await the arrival of

Attolico's message that is to be sent by
airplane....
'•July 27, 1959;

".... I receive Attolico^s report, which I
send to the Duce. The boner pulled by the
Ambassador becomes more and more evident. Once
again Ribbentrop has affirmed the German deter

mination to avoid war for a long time. The idea
of postponing the useless meeting at the Brenner
Pass takes hold of me more-and more. However I
ask the Duce to read tho report before he mMros
any decision . . . .

"July 28, 1939;

"After rocdin- the report, tho Duce decided

to postpone his mcotinG i"ith Eltler and I thrnl^
he did well. I telephone Attolico, who la -fVii
tryin:; t o kid us. This time Attolico missed

boat.

Her as frishtenod by his o'-n shadow nnf®

probablyi with somebody in the Gorman Porei^
Uinistry, was trying to save his country from i
non-existent danger. It's too bed. This Amba
dor has done good work, but now he permits hims»?^

to be taken in by the war panic. This may easlii

he explained by the fact that he is a rich man
"It appeeers that Hibbentrop has asked timo
to report to Hitler, who hod expressed himseie

against the conference.

Tomorrow v;e shin

reply on the postponement....

nave a

"August 2, 1939;

"....Attolico continues to harp on his
favorite theme of the meeting of Hitler and
llussolini, still insisting on tho bugbear nr
sudden decision that will be made bgr Iliti-

the fifteenth of August, The insistence of
Attolico keeps me v/ondering. Either this

Ambassador has lost his head or he sees

knows something which Iir.s completely esc^^^
us.

Appearances are in favor of the fir ?

alternative, but it is necessary to

events carefully.

^
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observe

"August 3, 1939;
"... llassimo writes a private letter from
which it appears that he is in disagreement with

the Ambassador as to the danger of an approaching
crisis.
He advises us against asking the Germans
for a clarification of their program.
If hassimo

notwithstanding his considerable, his very great
caution, has decided to take such a step, it means
that he is sure of what he is doing.
I have trans
mitted his letter to the iXice.

Roatta, the new

military attache, on the other hand, informs us of
the

concentration of forces

Polish frontier.

and

Vlho is right?

movements

en the

I may be mis

taken, but I continue to feel optimistic.
"August 4, 1939;
continues.

Attolico's alarmist bombardment
The situation seems obscure to me.

I am beginning to think of the possibility of
a meeting with vonRibbentrop.
The moment
has come when v/e must reall^r know how matters
stand.

The situation is too serious for us to

view developments passively . . . .

'•'August 6, 1939;

"....

•Ve discussed the situation,

v/e

are in

agreement in feeling that ve must find some way
out. By following the Germans we shall go to
v;ar and enter it under the most favorable condi

tions for- the Axis, and especially for Italy,

Our gold reserves arc reduced to almost nothing,
as well as our stocks of metals, and we are far

from having comploted our autarchic and military
preparations.

If the crisis comes we shall

fight if only to save our 'honor*.

But we must

avoid war. I propose to the Duce the idea of my
mooting with von Rihbontrop, - a meeting which"
on the svirfacG would have a private character

but du.ring which I v/ould attempt to continue '
discussion of Ilussolini's project for a \7orld

peace conferenco. lie is 'quite favorable.
Tomorrow v/e shall discuss the matter further

hut I am convinced that the Duce wants to move
vigorously to avoid the crisis.

And in so

doing he is right.

"August 7, 1939;

"....The Duce has approved my meeting with

von Ribbentrop, and I have therefore telephoned
Attolico instructions on this point.

Attolico

himself had thought of something of the snri ov. i
v/as

very glad,..,

,
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"August 8, 1939;

Kassimo v/rltea in a rather soothing
tone from Berlin, He does not foresee any
immediate aggressive intentions on the part of
Germany oven though the Danzig situation is
grave and dangerous.

"August 9, 1939;

"vonHibbentrop has approved the idea of our

meeting.

I decided to leave tomorrow night in

order to meet him at 3alzburg.

The Duce is

anxious that I prove to the Germans, by documen
tary evidence, that the outbreak of w ar at this

time would be folly. Our preparation is not such
as to allow us to believe that victory will be
certain. The probabilities are 50 per cent at
least so the Duce thinks. On the other hand
v;ithin three years, the probabilities will be

80 per cent,

Ilussolini lias alv;aya in mind the

idea of an international peace conference.

I

believe the move would bo excellent.

"August 10, 1939;

"The Duce is more than ever convinced of
the necessity of delaying the conflict. He

himself has worked out tho outline of a report

concerning the meeting at Salzburg which ends
Y/ith an allusion to interrtational negotiations
to settle the problems that so dangerously
disturb.European life.

"Before letting me go he recommends that T
should frankly inform tho Germans that we muqt

avoid a conflict with Poland, since it v/ili be

impossible to localize it, and a general w^r
would be disastrous for everybody. Never haq
the Duce spoken of tho need for peace with qn
much Y/armth and without reserve. i agree
him 100 per cent, and this conviction wm i! -.

me to redouble my efforts.
as to the results."

But I am doubtfi.?^
"uoriul

Hitler receiv^ Ciano and assured him that the
with Poland could be localized, and although Ciano e-^--

pressed grave misgivings and pointed out Itrlytg inability
to wage war, he fell under Hitler *s spell and v/eakenod
On 7 August 1939 von Ilassol records the follov/in
in his diary;
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''Host Important events

Ten or twelve days

ago Attolico celled on lliblDentrop (after having
seen ' "SIZSAEGJOZR) and finally Hitler, with a
mcssa-^^e from the 3Duce to the following effect:
the meeting of the Duce and the" Fuehrer at the
Brenner, set for August 4, would he useful only
if Something tangible should come out of it.

And, in view of the entire situation, this some
thing could only bo a decision to call a'six-

powcr' conference (Italy, G-ormany, Prance, England,
Spain,'Poland) in order to solve the ItalianFrench, as well as the G-erman-Polish, conflicts.
I f this Y^ere not done now i t v;ould have to be

done in four to six vieoks * time.

This message

had the effect of a thunderbolt."

On 20 August 1939, Heel, French Ambassador in V/arsaw

wrote the French Foreign ^^inister as follov^s:
•'prom a very reliable source I learned that

WilhelmstrassG circles were gravely concerned by
the turn of events, and believe that Ilerr Hitler
is determined to settle the jjanzig question
*bofore the first of September.'"

This information could only have come from ^'inillZSAEGHEr
or one of his circle in the Foreign Office,

On 31 August 1939 Cicno r ecorded the follovdnp-•

'"An ugly av/ckoning, Attolico telegraphs at
nine, saying that t he situation is desperate- and
that unless something now comes up there vd.ll be

war in a few hours. I go quickly to the Palazzo
Venezia. We must find a new solution. In a'Troe-

ment with the Duce I call Halifax by telephone to
tell him that the Duce can intervene with

only if he brings a fat prizes Danzig,- Emntv-

handed he can do nothing.

On his part. Lord

Halifax asks me to bring pressure on Berlin

that certain procedural difficulties ma-^ be'over

come and direct contacts established between
Gormany and Poland.

"I telephone thia to Attolico, who la more

and more pessimistic.

After a while Halifax aend^

word that our proposal regarding Danzig cannot be
adopted,"

These exhibits corroborate, in almost every detail'
the oral testimony of the defenfpnt and his witnf»c!c«e
m,
*
o t)Qs ^ i hey

are drav/n from sources which are unimpeached.
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We deem the fact to he established that instead of

. participatins, planning, pr-eparin-g 02? initiating the

war against Poland, the defendant used every means ir*

his "oower to prevent the catastrophe#

He

as not master

of the situation; he had no decisive voice, but he did

not sit idly by and atolidly follow the dictates of
either Hitler or Ribbentrop, but by warnings to other

powers, v/hem he knew would be involved in the war if
Hitler^s mad plan came to fruition, and by suggestions
which he caused to be made to England to hasten the

completion ,of its proposed pact \7ith Russia, and by bring
ing all the pressure ho could, to cause the Italians to

intervene, ho s.ou^j^t to avert it.

Although tncse efforts

Y/oro futllo, his lack of success is not the criteria.

Personalities, hesitation, lack of vision and tne tioe

of events, over which he had no control, sv/ept away his
efforts.

But for this ho is not at fault.

We find that he is ROT? GUILTY under Count One

respecting aggressive v/ar against Poland.
Denmark and Norway;

On 16 March 1940 von Hassel records

the followings

TSISSAECrUiiR is alarmed because, on the

occasion of R^-trop-s visitJo^Hojne^^^
Karch 10-11. l.u.solinl^r
offensive,
a
•' ord
'ibrotherhood In destiny' and
Tout spoke of our Mo^n
conflict. He
of his indention
g^ya'^iona regarding the
had, hoY/ever, maae rescivc.
date of his

action.
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explp.natiorx is this:

Mussolini

received the distinct impression that Hitler
is determined to atteck.
This being so, he

thinks it. would be a tactical error to issue
further warnings and now prefers to show him

self sympathetic. If, contrary to expectation,
things go well and if everything else looks
favorable, he will come in oii our side. Should
matters go badly, he still has an alibi and can
work out a way to extricate himself...."
Some months before the invasion of Henmark and Norway,
VJEIZSAECEEP received information from Canaris that this

matter was being considered but was unable to obtain details. '
It appears that on 6 April "rsiZSAECKEB was present at a
conference with the ""ehrmacht, at which the Foreign Office

was informed of the details of the plan and of the part

it Was expected to pl^y on the diplomatic side.

On the

same day he had a conference with Pibbentrop at which Gaus
was nresent.
earlier.

It does not anpear which conference was the

Gaus made two statements about this matter:

one

which he confirmed on the witness stand, and one which he

made to the interrogating officer sometime in 1946.

In

the latter he states th^^'t ^'raiZSAECrER seemed as surprised

nt the news as he himself was, and "both of us reacted to

this sudden information by pointing out ineffectually that

it would awaken a storm of resentment throughout the whole
world•"
0

In the later affidavit, which he confirmed on the

vjitness stand, he deposed that 'JEIZSAECPEP did not seem to
be surorised and made no protest.

In view of these

conflicting statements, we cannot say, with the necessary
degree of certainty, where the truth lies, but in view of
the f«ct th^t it was only on 3 April th-t iceitel informed
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Bibbentrop of the plan, apologizing for the fact that
the Foreign Office would have so little time to prepare

its diplomatic tasks, it is unlikely that "''ffllZSAFCFER

had precise information before 6 Arril,
We deem the preci?=^e date of ^'^JFIZSASCFEBknowledge
as immaterial.

Hitler had already made his decision, the

Wehrmacht had made its plans, and was in fact on the move,

although acting with utmost secrecy.
^•JFIZSAECKFR

Fothing which

could have done would have had any effect on

the situation, and there vjas little or no time for maneuver

ing and little, and probably no, opportunity to give warning.
The part that the Foreign Office pDayed in the matter of

these two aggressions is insignificant and consisted in

sending notes by courier to its renresentatives in Denmark

and Norway, who were, at a specified hour and day, to
communicate their contents to those governments.

These

notes were not prepared by ^mZSAFCT^ and the most which
can be said is that he either ordered or knew of the

aispatch of the courier.
But even here there are some indications that the

defendant was perturbed about the possibility of the war

being further extended.

In March 1940, Sumner Welles,

then Undersecretary of State for the United States of

America, visited Berlin, We quote frocr his book, "The
Time for Decision*'*.

**Ribbentrop has a comcletely closed mind.

It struck me as also a very stupid mind.

The'

man is saturated with hate for England to the
exclusion of any other dominating mental
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influence. He ie clearly without background
in international affaire, and he was guilty
of a hundred lies in his rresentation of
German policy during recent years.
*T:ate that seme afternoon I went to see
rtate Secretary VOH
in his office
at the Foreign Office. In the German official

hierarchy, the position of state secretary has
corresponded since the days of Bismarck to that
•of undersecretary of state in our own country...
"X snoke with Herr VOH "-.'EIZF-ABGFER of my
earlier conversation with Ribbentrop, and after

hesitating a moment, "rSIZSAECF^R said:

*X am

going to be quite frank with you, X have been
strictly instructed not to discuss with you in
any way any subject which relates directly or
indirectly to the possibility of peace,*
•"He then drew his chair toward the center
of the room and.motioned to me to do likewise.
It was evident that the omnipresent German
secret r^olice dictaphones vjere installed in

the walls rather than in the central lighting
fiytures.

•''7e had for a while a desultory conversa

tion.

I then reverted again to my conversation

with Ribbentrop, I said that, if the feeling of

the German Government as a whole was as decisive
as that of Herr von Ribbentrop that a war of
devastation and of conQuest "'as the only course

for Germany to follow, I would be needlessly

taking up the time of the German authorities by
prolonging my stay.

"Herr
-ncix VON
vwiv ^•'rEIZ'^AECT^R
'-.j-'-jthought a good
gOOG three
before rer^lying.
rer^lvine.
Then he
ho leaned
i
minutes before
Then
toward,
me and
ano said:
*Xt
xu is
j-c of
ux the
one utmost
ubmosc importanc
importancp
that you say that personally to the Fuehrer when
aoTT

TiO-rranvnoTT^r

4-r-.
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you see him tomorrow.♦

••X waited a moment myself, and then a^'ked
him: *Xet me have your cer^onal advice, for I
am now asking en entirely perronal question
Bo you believe that any suggestions for peace
conversations proffered by Mussolini would have
onu favorable

reception here?*

•'This time Herr VOF
again waited
His reniy v^hen it came waa^
•^•That X have already said ebout the Fuehrer ' *

before answering.

answers a cart of your question.

But.• end
here he motioned to the Foreign Office in

we were,

and

here

f.he relations
re.Tnhions between GerLnu

Italy have narrowed

greatly.»

t.

^ ^

-

...... •.j.Xa.'r.:

E2i-

"The only interpretation v^Jhich could be

drawn from his statement was that in ''\r5IZSAECrER'S
oninion, if the Duce were to approach Hitler

directly and secretly, it might'have some effect.
If Ribbentrop knew of the approach he would do
his utmost to block i t . "

'••hile

it is not wholly clear that '^^IZSAECKER spoke

with reference to Denmark and Norway, it is, we think,
apparent that he' was apprehensive of future action on the

part of Hitler and v^as endeavoring to have pressure brought
on Mussolini.

We find ^'jEIZSAECKER NOT GUILTY under Count

One as to Denmark and Norway,
✓

The LOW Countries.

The plans for the aggressive invasions

and wars against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg were

prepared shortly after the beginning of the Polish war.
^"EIZSAECirSR admits that he knew them as early as 12

October 1939, and verified that it was only a question

of when they would be put in motion.

For various reasons

these invasions were postponed from time to time, but
finally" erupted on 10 May 1940.

The question for determination is not whether

^f^I7f=^AECKER had prior knowledge, but what, if anything,
did, either to implement, or, on the other hand, to
prevent and frustrate these invasions.

We shall in

particular deal with these in the reverse order.

It was obvious to the defendant that these invasions

if carried out, had but dne Purpose, namely, a flanking
movement against France, thus avoiding the hazards of

direct attack against the Maginot line. On 12 October,
that is, immediately after he became aware o-f the plans

he fufhished Rlbpehtrop with a memorandum and followed
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it up by a discussion of 26 October,

We quote from these

memorande because they are significant:

*"'7ithout v-aiting to anticipate the proper
military judgment, the following is an
accomplished fact in my orinion:
"lo

The submarine f=nd

surface commercial

war, in consideration of the present number of
warships, is not able to interfere with the
British supplies from overseas to such an eixtent
as to compel Great Britain to assume a. concilia
tory attitude, even if enemy and neutral shins
are ^unk without warning.
The German submarine

building program v^ill be able to meet the
requirements only after a considerable time.
"2. The war in the air against British
supplies from overseas can likeviise not be
conducted effectively this v;inter.

*'3.

Bven a combination of noints 1 and 2

meaning the intensified war on the sea and in '
the air against the British sea lanes would be
inadeouate today. Any such waging of the war
must be undertaken with sufficient means and
wdth lightning sneed unless it reters out.

"4. In consideration of the structure of
Greet Britain, airraids on the vital targets on
land would not give much hone for dealing
deadly blow to Great Britain,

"Anart from'^the military reasons there are
also political viewpoints which forbid the

^

starting of the unlimited war by submarine^

and in the air in the near future.

This manner

of wiarfare would force the neutral seafarins

t>

.

states into the arms of Great Britain The
would oresumacly soon disrupt their reletinnc,

with us. Psychological end materiel rLer^e^

similar to thofe of 1917-18 «oaia be unevolaable

a- 8 conpequence of the unreatrioted submarine
war. For thip_reaPon vre would make new enemlea
without being in the possession of arm® whioi
would force Great Britain to her knees.

sniitting off France from Great

Britain by force and to induce her to concluflr=
senarete neace, an offensive against France r,n
land would be necessary. According to mv
information, the success of a frontal

along the border between Germany and T^r-nop"

would come too costly.

An offensivp

\

Belgium would perhaps result in bringing thi

-
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country into our h^nd^, but v>;ould not open
the road

for an entry into France,
-^e v-ould
only have a new, juat as long and only much

weaker defense-line than we have today.

The

BTten^ion of the war theatre would benefit

only France and not Uv<=.
Both methods — the
frontal and the flanking attack — will not
lead to the military target and. would only

awaken the fighting snirit of the French
citizen and

soldier which is, s t i l l dormant

today. Whether the possession of Belgium
would actually be irdisrensable and decisive
in the war in the air against Great Britain,
must be left open,

*'From political viewnoints, the entry in

Belgium

ould earn us only all the disadvantages

with which we are sufficiently acquainted from
the year ofl914.

"Obviously, our strength lies in the

defense.

It is nearly impregnable,

it gives us

the wanted military security.
It saves our
material. It helps us to keer the neutral
groups intact..'..

If the enemy does not commit the grave
error of violating the neutrality in a serious
manner, then we can hope that the constant
inactivity of a defense on both siees win

slov'ly weaken the will to fight in France until
it dies. And that would open the road to peace.
The decision on whether we better remain on the*
defensive in the west or start an offensive

after the conclusion of the "^oland campaign is
8 matter of politics to a large extent,

"An offensive would be imperative if it is
expedient to bring the war to a speedy end. put
there is no promire for such a success. The riowand the political effects would not be in harmonv

with each other. It goes without saying that
the defensive is also a test of our nerves a?
well. Nevertheless, I'ith Poland we have a pawn

in our hands, while the enemy still has to procure
such a

pawn.

"The offensive would be the beginning of the
struggle for life or death. And the third Parties
would have the last laugh. The defensive still
leaves us the possibility of a negotiated peace
•^ending developments, I believe that the defensive
should be mairtained.

-
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"Having received information that a general

offenFive witti an invaaion of Luxembourg, Belgium
and Holland wpf being prepared in the beginning
or in the middle of November, I submitted a brief
memorandum to Herr von Ribbentrop on 12 October

»39, in which I discussed the military plans for

the six winter months from the political view
points and in particular advised against the
invasion of the three neutral countries.
"On IP October we had a

conference on this

matter during which Herr von Ribbentrop briefly
mentioned the reasons pro and con,

but spoke

dispassionately, saying that fate must not be
provoked or something to that effect. He also
was of the opinion that the Chamberlain speech
of 12 October offered a suitable starting point

for further peace talks, until the Fuehrer, in
the evening, gave vent to an opposite opinion.
"Since I had no discussions any more in the

meantime , but received information about the plan
of the offensive which became more and more

definite, today in Dahlem, in the house of the
Minister, I again led the conversation to this

topic and em">hasized my previous statements.

But I soon found out that Herr von Ribbentrop

was not.inclined to go deeper into this matter.

He said that my memorandum was a concent which'
was similar to the terminology of the Anglo-

French propaganda, which, if considered closely
did not want us to strike before the spring of '
1940 when the full war production of Great

Britain would become effective on the Continent.

The reproach of being a defeatist sounded again'
as in the fall of *39. Herr von Ribbentrop
talked about his responsibility which I had
better leave to him. 'We will not discuss this

matter any more.♦

"I countered vith the remark that I was
sorry to hear this because I was in the

possession of arguments which were important

in my opinion but could not be discussed in

such haste, of course.

»Herr von Ribbentrop concluded our conver
sation with a gesture which unmistakably
expressed his desire not to be bothered anv
longer with this matter."

On 9 January 1940 ''rSIZSAECKFR addressed another

memorandum to Ribbentrop regarding Mussolini's letter to
Hitler, in v/hich he says:
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"Th6 T)u.c6 doep not believo in p victory
in the ^'Tept, Any attempt to force such e

decipion, in his opinion, "willlesd to Surope

going Bolshevist. "He therefore wf^nts Germany
not to look for military decisions in the We^t,
but to mature her military aims*...

"It goes v'ithout saying that the Duce*s

p^yIq© is motivatec by Italian egotism, but

j^svertheless, it i*^ the advice of a friend.
If it is rejected the Duce will certainly

freedom, of action, and wants to have it.
Hip futile warning will serve him then as an

eycuse with the ^•'estern "lowers. The Duce will
clearly indicate a parting of the roads. It

must be taken seriously."

In Karch 1940 he had the discussion with Sumner

•^Telles to which we have already referred.
These documents do not evidence a desire to forward

plans of aggressive war, but rather both a desire and a
purnose to avert it. Such were his pacific professions,

«nd we now turn to whpt If olPimed to be his sffirmetive

PPrtioipption in these crimes egeinst peece.
On 8 T^ovember 1939 ''lEIZSAECIHR "nd Attolico con-

ferred, pnd tjeizS.ARCT'KE renorted thus (pfter referring
to the offer of the Queen of Hollsnd end the ring of
Belgiiini):

'During the further couP' e of the
.nnver-ation I t old the. Italian that ©t present

Motests were being mede to us by Belgium
of repeated transit flights over

S
from all
the.=e
oompleints
reemed
in my
opinion
to be
Belgi-n Perritory;
te

•'li^ified . oninstructed,
the other hand,
however.
1
JU.tifle
we should
complain

about the InlS^^tion
reneepe^

sovereign

of Belgian

pj-a Holland would have to

Porsider'preserving their neutrality not

n'fr vtth words,
withboth
deeds,
and oppose
only^^''i^^
^oenrp but
unless
countries

BngliPli ^oin'thc're utation of exclusively

favori% our opponents." (Smnhasis supplied)
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Unless otherwise explained, this conference does
not indicate an attitude either of.helpfulness, under

standing or sympathy toward Belgium or Holland, or any
hint to the Italians which they could use to prevent war

from spreading to the Lowlands,
Schwante and. by the defendant

The assertion by Buelow-

that the former *s and

V'UI7>^AECIP5Rinfluence became the exciting factor of
the Dutch and Belgian offers for mediation fails after
examination of

the

evidence.

The next incident is that arising from the

inquiries of the Belgian Government regarding the
invasion documents found on a German airplane which

grounded or crashed in Belgium on or about 10 January

1940.

The Foreign Office, on Pibbentrop^s orders, tried

to conceal the facts.

But this action is of no partioulpr

significance unless it was a part of a plan to deceive the
Low Countries as to

Germany♦s

aggressive intentions.

On 15 January 1940,

reports a conversa

tion with Count Davignon, the Belgian Ambassador to Berlin
in which the latter complained about the violation of
Belgian neutrality by German Planes; 'LEIZSAECIpsp said
he '^romi^ed «=n early renly, not only as to current

alleged violations of Belgian territorial rights, but

concerning previous complaints,

Fe then "sroceeded to

discuss a series of reports in the Belgian press, all
of which he claimed showed a shocking state of

^^citement

and of military activity, which wa.'^ one-sidedly directed
again-'^t Germany; th«t the Ambassador admitted this p t
asserted that the military missions were merely
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r^reliminsry safety measures such as already had been

taken by Holland and Switzerland and gave the reason,

therefor- . that everyone in Berlin was breaking of the
German invasion of Belgium and Holland and of the

repeated flying of German planes over his country and

of the warnings which had come from Italy.

^'BIZSAECIHiIB

reported that he had re'-lied that Brussels should not be
*

influenced by gossip in the streets and that English and

V

French rlanes had been seen at the Belgian frontier and
crossed in flight, and finally, "I could not recognize

?

any particular cause for Belgian alarm."
On 16 January 1944 Finister Speak expressed his

annrehensions to the German'?'"inister Buelow-Schwante, in
which he made clear that Belgium would resist any violation
of its neutrality either by '"est or Bast.
On 17 January

reported a second visit

frc^ the Belgian Ambassador, in which the latter not only
*

exprsssed hia fears, but mentioned the military mea£?n2;«03

taken against Belgians and the military orders found in
>

the airplane heretofore mentioned.

"/'EIZSAECiaB renorts

that he answered that he lacked a reason for such behavior,
which he considered unjustified and susnicious, and he

Ftated further that as to the captured military documents,
"I looked surprised and rcr^eated my remark of the day

fi

before yesterday that I knew of this story only through
the press."

on ?? January 1940 'JEIZSAFCTP":P reported this

convers'^tion ^^ ith Attolico, who showed him an article

K':'
-
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in the "Temps" aealing v^ith the emergency landing of a
German nlane near Mecheln, ana•remarked

that this was an

important event whlc h h'^;iZSA'5CK'5R had not mentioned on
the occasion of Attolico^s visit the previous week, but

as he,

did not desire to enter into the

subject, he merely said that the story was already making
the rounds with the foreign ares^ , and asked Attmioo

whether he could not tell him why it was that the Belgians

('

were so alarmed a week ago,

MillZSAECTCBR further rer^orted

that he could not determine whether the Italians were

informed on this whole question.

The defense submitted B^^hibit 14S, a certified
declaration of the Bclgi^'n J.mbassador, vjhich contains
the follo^^'ing:

"... Bid the Rt'^te Secretary ^^ttempt to
nrevent thi?- invasion? It is difficult for

the undersigned to make any statement on this
subject.
At ^11 events, Herr YON

gave the imnression that he hoped to play his
nart in j=n attem'-^t to prevent an extension of

the war in the "'est. On the other hand, he
made no attempt to deceive the undersigned
or to relax his vigilance by stating th«t an
invasion of Belgium ^nd the low Countries was
out of the question."

This is an exceedingly cautious and uninformatlve
statement.

The rroseoution exhibit to which we have

referred was offered in evidence on

January 1948, end

the affidavit of Count Bavignon was authenticated, on R3

Farch 1948,

In view of the meticulous care with which

the o"se of the defense wae Prepared, we deem it extremely
unlikely that the attention of the Ambassador should
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not have been called to Exhibit ?47,

and inquiry made

e.F to v-'hether he had not received confidential informa

tion as to the activities of the feared event and
occurrence

which had

caused such great anpreheneion on

the part of the Belgian Ambaassdor,

It is to be

remembered that both *'^IZSA3CFER and Count Davignon

testified to the close personal friendship which they
felt toward each other,

V'hen lavignon made his final call on the day the
German troons initiated their invasion, VJEXZSAECEEE

repeatedly tried to convince the Belgian th^t his govern
ment should cease resistance and gave an emphatic

description of the annihilating consequences to Belgium
if this was not done.

The defendant did not e'xplain his

deceptive statements to the Ambassador that he knew

nothing of Germany's intention to invade, and his
explanations of this threat of dire consequences and
annihilation are not only inadequate but his purported

lack of recoilection of what he said is unimpressive.

During all this time, as he himself admits, he
knew that the invarions were planned and prepared, nnd
waited only the strategic moment for their execution,

^'^ere we to judge him only by these things alone we would

be compelled to the conclusion that he was consciously,
even though unwillingly, p-^rticipating in the plans.
But in determining matters of this kind we may not
substitute the calm, undisturbed judgment derived from
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Qfter-knov-iedge, v;tiolly divorced froTithe strain and

emotions of the event, for that of the man who was in
the midst of things, distracted by the imnact of the
conflagration and torn by conflicting emotions and his
traditional feelings of nationality.
This much is clear, that ''^IZSAECT^B advised

against the invasions and gave cogent reasons why they
should not be embarked uron.

His advice was rejected

and this, rejection was not the first he had suffered.
He had before warned the "^estern Powers and unfortunately

his warnings were ineffective.

He had made suggestions

'.'"hich were or could not be carried out.

events had made his prophecies of failure
seem like those of Cassandra.

The course of

disaster

Hven a stout heart for

a time might fail under these circumstances and the
lethargy of futility take its place.

That his oposition

revived and that he ^l^^yed a real part in the continuous

underground opposition to and plots against Hitler and

further forcible removal of that incubus from the scene

of action, we have no doubt., Hven heroes have their bad
1

days,-and while perhaps the defendant cannot be includeil
in that category, he should not be held to e stricter
test.

jiccording to him the benefit of reasonable doubt,
we are constrained to exonerate him.

He did not originat'

the invasions and advised against them.

He warned

Hibbentrop against the p^estern offensives and the

-
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utilization of unre?tricteci submarine "warfare.

He may

have failed to give the Belgians, Dutch and Italians

specific "warnings of the coming events, but that seems
to be the eytent of his misdoing.
stances "we find

the defendant

Under these circum
ZSAECTUilB FOT GUILTY with

respect to the invasion of the X-ow Countries.
Yugoslavia and Greece.

^

On ?7 October 1940 Mussolini

delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Government and almost
immediately thereafter initiated an aggressive "war against
Greece.

y

^

This "was done "without previous consultation with

the German Government, although it had strong suspicions,
amounting almost to a certainty, that the invasion was in

T-^rospect.

Hitler did not interfere, inasmuch as he himself

had initiated the Danish and Forwegian aggressions without
consulting Mussolini, and felt because of this he should
not Interfere with the ^^roposed Italian incursion.
The defendants ''raiZSAHCKHR and 'COEHMAHU "v^ere
I

advired of Mussolini's nrospective operation. The campaign
broke down during the fall and XA?inter, and military disaster
became imminent. Late in the fall of 1940 Germany commenced
to build up large forces in Eumsnia, first on the pretext

that it was sending a military mission to that country in
order to train the Kumanian Army, and later because of

the alleged necessity of protecting Rumania's oil fields

^

and the danger that the British might establish a Salonika
front.

-
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From the record it appears that, at first, Hitler's
Pumanian adventure v^as part of his plan of aggression

against Pus^la and that his agreements with Eumania and
the disnatch of troop units there was an actual desire

on his part to -orotect his southern flank:, and his sources,
not only of oil, but of food imnorts.

However, as the

Italian invasion not only lost impetus, but suffered

severe military setbacks, he felt it necessary to come

1

to their support.

The alleged presence of British

troop units in Greece was but an excuv^e and not the

reason for his action.

Renorts of the German military

Attache and of the German Foreign Office representatives
in Athens clearly disclose this.

But even had the British rendered, substantial aid
to Greece, this did not serve as an excuse for Hitler'b

Invasion^

Italy was the aggressor.

It was a signatory

to the Briand-Eellogg Tact and Britain had the right to

come to the aid of Greece, Y?hile Germany, on the other
hand, had no right to come to the aid of the Italian

>

aggressor. Nor is the argument of self-defense available
to Germany.

Ho nation which Initiates aggressive

vjar can

avail itself of the claim of Pelf-defense against those

who have taken up arms against the aggressor. The first

sggreeplon stigmatizes every other act, either in waging
war against or extenaing it to other countries. The

action of Germany in Greece r,ae aggressive ana in viola
tlon of its treaty obligations, was without justifiaf
and in violation of international law.
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19ia:l^&*RSer!iEre6'

I^^Qganoff of Bulgaria that O-ermany v?as in agreement
v^ith the Bulgarians'• desire to obtain an outlet in the

•Aegien Pea aoT^roach betv^een the Marica and Struma Pivers,

but Bulgaria must declare itself unreservedly willing to
^ign the Three-Power'Pact when requested so to do.
On 2 February 1941 ^^ffilZSAECirER informed the

.j

Turkish Ambassador that the decisions which the Eeieh

1i'

Oovernment had taken concerning the safety of the Balkans
were "irrefutable,"

On 10 March he informed Eibbentrop

that during the whole of Draganoff's activities in Berlin,
the latter never named any territorial aims but those

an^rised by "us", i.e., Germany.
Notwithstanding these acts, howjsver, there is no
evidence that WZPAECiniT? planned, prerered for or

initiated the war, or that he took any substantial nart
in it.

Me find that he should be and is found NOT GUILTY

with respect to the invasion of Greece.

As to Yugoslavia, the story is still shorter.

An

attempt was made to gain the adherence of Yugoslavia to
the Tripartite Pact.

Most of these negotiations were
%

carried on by Pibbentrop personally.

The Yugoslavian

.Government finally agreed to become a signatory to that

nact, but thereupon was overthrown by a coup d*etat and
the new government which took its place rejected the
nroposed agreement and Hitler decided immediately on an
invasion.

From that decision there was no wavering, and

"•MllZSAECI'n^'P had no pert in making the decisions and no
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part in implementing them.

He Fhould be and ir found

HOT GUIITJ with regard to the aggressive invasion of

Yugoslavia.
Eussia.

On 21 September 1940 ''.'raiZSABCrHlH was informed

by Admiral Buerkner of the OlC'^f of I-Ceitel^s memorandum of

20 September concerning the military mission'to Rumania,
which stated that the real tasks, which neither Rumania
nor "our own troops" must be allowed to oerceive, were:

(A)

To protect the oil fields against attack
by a third power;

(B)

Render the Rumanian forces capable of

carrying out certain tasks in accordance
with rigid nlans developed in favor of
German interests;

(C)

and

To prepare for the employment of German

and of Rumanian troops in the event that
a war with Soviet Russia was being "forced

upon us."

(Emphasis surplied.)

On 14 Ser-tember ""rgizSAECYER issued

a draft of

instructions regarding the status of the German m.ilitary
mission to Rumania, and its subordination to the German
Minister at Bucharest.

later, toward Christmas 1940, he was informed by
military circles of Hitler*s intention to wage a war

against the Soviet Union, although he asserts that he
received no official information until the late spring
of 1941.

On 1 March 1941 TOIZS-AECF^R informed the

-
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Russian Ambassador, as per instrQotions, regarding
the German troop transports to Rumania and of German

information regarding British troop movements into
Greece; that Turkey would doubtlessly lie low "as we

would certainly not turn against her unless she provoked
us.- I was the more sure of this since our troops would

withdraw when the British danger was prevented, of which
the Soviet Government was nreviously informed in January."
Other than exhibits vjhich disclose

had knowledge of

Hitler♦s

that WEIZSAEGKHIR

plans to invade Russia, and

this he admits, there is no evidence that he took any

affirmative action toward initiating, planning or preparing
for the aggression against that nation.
On the other hand, on 28 April 1941 the defendant

wrote to Ribbentrop advising against a German-Russian
conflict.

He said;

"I can summarize in one sentence my views
on a German-Russian conflict:
If every Russian
city reduced to ashes were as valuable to us
as a sunken British warship, I should advocate
the, German-Russian war for this summer; but I
believe that we would be victors over Russia

only in a military sense, end would, on the
other hand, lose in an economic sense....
"... But the sole decisive factor is

whether this project will hasten the fall of
England.
*tVe must distinguish between two
•oossibilities:

"(a) England is close to collapse; if we
accent this (assumption), we shall encourage
England by taking on a new opponent, Russia
is no potential ally of the English. England
can expect nothing good from Russia, Hope in
RnsBla

is not postponing England's collapse.

With. Russia we do not destroy any English
hones •

"(b) If we do not believe in the imminent
collapse of England, then the thought might

suggest itself that by the use of force, we
must feed ourselves from Soviet territory.

I

take i t as a matter of course that we shall

advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond that.
I doubt very much, however, whether we shall be
able to turn to account what we have v-on in

the face of the well-known passive resistance
of the '^lav.

I

do not see in the Russian Ptate

any effective ooposition capable of succeeding

A

the Communist system and uniting with us and
being of service to us.
'-'Je would therefore
probably have to reckon with a continuation
of the Stalin system in Eastern Russia and
in Siberia end with a

renewed outbreak of

hostilities in the spring of 194?,

The window

to the "Pacific Ocean would remain shut.

German attack on Russia wiould only give

the British new moral strength.

It would be

interoreted there as German uncertainty as to

the success of our fight against England, '7e
would thereby not only be admitting that the war
was going to last a long time, yet, but we might

actually nrolong it in this way, instead of
shortening it.
"V/EIZ^-AECFER

"This position is drafted in very brief
form, since the Reich Foreign Minister wanted
it within the shortest possible time.
^^A/EIZSAECKER"

Notwithstanding his arguments regarding the necesf^ity
of destroying England, his memorandum is a strong argument
against the invasion of Soviet Russia.

And it is his

f

attitude with regard to this charge in which we are here

interested, and not his attitude toward England.

In view

of the peculiar mentality of Ribbentrop and the necessity

of couching arguments in terms which he would both under

stand and appreciate, it is quite understan^iable why sound

108 -

advice would be coupled with pyrotechnics against a
third power, namely, Great Britain.

The situation here is

different from one where a man argues one way and acts in

^

another.

In this case v^BIZ^^AECirEP not only did not act,

but no action would have been effective and even sound
advice was futile.

"fJe have already held that mere knowledge of

aggressive war or of crminal acts is not sufficient,
but it is suggested that ''JEIZSAECrER should have told
the Russian Ambassador that he was aware of Hitler's clans
f

of aggressions against that country.

For an abundance of

reasons, this cannot be made the basis of a judgment of

guilt,

^^^e mention but a few.

First, he could not talk with

the Ambassador except through an interpreter and the
hazard that the interpreter might betray him was obviously

/

imminent, and the fatal consequences clear; second, there
still remained the possibility either that Hitler might

change his mind or that -circumstances might arise which
would compel him to alter his clans; and third, the
revelation of the actual situation to the Russian Ambassador,

even if it remained secret, would not cause Hitler to change
his plans but would necessarily entail death and suffering
f

to thousands of German youth, themselves innocent of any

part in the planning, preparation and initiating of the
^

aggression.

The only course which we think he could

follow or v/iseiy attempt was the one he followed, namely,
to submit the reasons why the Proposed step was likely
to be fatal to the German people.

His advice was not

followed and the failure to follow it brought disaster.

....M

The propecution ineiftF, hovever, that there is
criminality in his assertion that he dia not desire the

defeat of his own country.

^

The answer is

Who does?

One may quarrel with, and oonose to the noint of Violence
and assassination, a tyrant whose i^rograms mean the ruin
of one*F country.

1

But the time has not yet arrived, when

any man would vievj with satisfaction the ruin of his
own ^eople and the loss of its- young manhood.

To apply

any other standard of conduct is to set up a test that

^

has never yet been suggested as proper, and which, assuredly,
we are not orerared to accept as either wise or good.

We

are not to be understood as holding that one who knows
that a war of aggression has been initiated is to be
relieved from crininal fes'^onsibility if he thereafter

^

wages it, or if, with knoi/ledge of its pendency, he does
not exercise such nov-zers and functions as he possesses to
T^revent its taking place.

But we are firmly convinced

that the failure to advise a prospective enemy of the
coming aggression in order that he may make military
pre-narations which would, be fatal to those who in good

;

faith respond to the call of military duty does not

A

•

constitute a crime.

The defendant

^

should be and we find

him NOT GUILTY with regard to the aggression against
Russia,

-
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United ^tates of America.

On 15 May 1941 ''/]5IZ?ASCKH!R

wrote a memorandum to Ribbentror which states as follows:

*'Any political treaty between Japan and

the United J^tates is undesirable at present.
The text of the treaty, however, in its present
form v*/ould mean that Japan withdraws from us.
I t would

leave us alone on the battlefield

against Snglvand and the United States,

The

Three-Power Pact vJould

In

be discredited.

the concluding sentence of Par, II the sanction

ing of the United states help to England is

plainly anti-German (in the English text even
clearer than in the German)•
*'Since the text of the treaty ia already
in Washington it has already had a damaging
effect.

One should

try to so obstruct i t

subsequently to such aji extent that the treaty
will not be concluded.
(Definition of the
Japanese treaty interpretation^. -r^rovisions
for effectiveness, dependence of the
effectiveness of II, III, etc.)

"Should the treaty, despite this, still
not be prevented, c«re must be taken that
Janan in reality comes back agpin in the

ranks. The minimum would be that Japan extends
its assistance to Germany on the same principles
-

as the United ^tates i t s aspis-tpnce towards

England."

On 4 September 1941 TOIZSAECIP^ reported his

conversation with Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin,
oshima stated that he had made a report to Tokyo on the

subject of relations of Janan-Ameiica.

IVEIZSAECTU? states:

"This opinion of Oshima quite coincides
with the one desired by us, so th-'^t I actually
had l i t t l e to

add.

Nevertheless I

have also

on this occasion extensively used the ideas
from the order cabled to Tokyo of 25 of last
month - 364 R - and at the end tried to

i

encourage further the somewhat depressed
ambassador by telling him I could not at all

imagine that in the Japanese nation and in
accordance with it also in Japanese politics,
there should not, in the end, the military
instincts gain the upper hand."

-

Ill

-

In November 1941 vraiZSAEGN^P. '^reT;'=re(a

e

memorandum

which became the basis of a Foreign Office telegram to
the German Ambassador in Tokyo,

He states that the German

Military Attache in ^Tashingt-on reported that:

"American war policy during the past few

months based on the assumption that lanan
could be kept out of the vjar. Only thUv® is.
to be explained the division of fleets and

base on Iceland, which permanently ties up

considerable parts of the fleet in the Atlantic.
With every Japanese attack on Russia, China,
Singapore, or Dutch Indies, America is immediately
confronted with the dilemma of either pocketing
an attack on its prestige or saving face by
going to war.
Dilemma becomes the more
difficult as U.S. entry into wf=r on tr.'-'o fronts

impairs supply and possibility of aid to
England and not only turns the "Pacific but
also the Atlantic into war theater, thereby

necessitating the splitting up of American
fighting forces as well as convoy protection
to the Far Fast for indispensable raw material
supply.
^""'rior to an American entry into the war

the following is to be assured:
"(1)
(2)

An above all attitude of Japan,
the unconditional obedience of

Latin-American countries,

(3)

(4)
(5)

conclusion of preparations for
land and air warfare,

complete gearing of war industries,
possibility of being decisive in
the war.

"Roosevelt's

and Churchill's

threats

addressed to Japan must, as hitherto, not be
evaluated as an expression of strength but as
an expression of concern.

One is of the

opinion in America that Japan can be effectively
intimidated, if it is threatened simultaneously
from Singapore and Hawaii. American-English
press to this effect campaign is in progress.
At the same time it is impressed upon Japan
that Japan as a friend of America's and
England's will have entirely different prospects

than as a friend of Germany's. Fuehrer as
master of the British Empire, the Netherlands,
and Russia lould be a much more dangerous
opponent for Ja-oan than the British Empire or

•

•

the United •'^t^tes.' A? e mptter of feet, England,
the United states, and Euaaia, want nothing
more than pep.oe and friend^hi^ in the recific
Tfl'ith full regard for
intereats,

American tactics, aa in the past two year?, aim
to deceive the opponent and to camouflage its
• own weakness.

^Tlease uae foregoing renort of military
attache in connection with the above-mentioned
cable."

Thus it will be seen that 'w'EIZSAECI'EP was anxious

not only that Ja^an remain an active member of the Tri

partite "^act, and that he favored J"a,pan's expansion and
aggression to the southeast, namely, toward Singapore,
Burma and the Dutch Indies, and alro pgainst Eussie,

but

that he was aware that this might bring in its train

intervention on the part of the United ^^tates.

But this

does not establish that he favored or recommended an

aggressive war against the United -"^tates.

Horevoer, the

record discloses that Japanese acticn was not induced by

German nrom'^ting, but by its own evaluation of the

situation and its own interests, and that the attack on

t^'earl Harbor and the ^hillinines was a surprise to Hitler,
the Foreign Office, and to ''''JSIZSAECITIE.

The German decision to declare war on the United
Ptates was not made by or on the advice of ''JEIZSAECFEH.

Thus the evidence does not establish ^TSIZSAECT'TIFguilt
and we E^^OHEFATE him and find him NOT GUIITY so far as

sggresplve war against the United f-tates of Arerica is
concerned.
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